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Life, Dignity, and Autonomy
Introductory
This  thematic block presents several  studies based on  the  lectures given at 
the summer school Bioethics in Context II: Autonomy, Dignity and Life as 






block  seeks  to  comprehend  life,  dignity,  and  autonomy as  the  terms  refer-
ring to the human individual, its social self-understanding and relationships 
to  fellow  humans,  to  other  living  beings,  and  to  the  environment. Dignity 
and autonomy  are  firmly  established  in  the  predominant  field  of  bioethics 
and have, by popular demand, received global attention, e.g. in the UNESCO 














































The Philosophical Concept of Life and 
Its Role in the Foundation of an Integrative Bioethics
Abstract
The essay demonstrates how bioethics can find an ethical dimension of its own and an 
original source of normativity by taking a fresh look at the concept of life. This requires a 
concept of life which is more than empirical, the logic of which is developed, in the first 
instance, from the insights arrived at by the philosophers of German idealism, but also 
from those of the more recent phenomenology of life. The basic problem of an integrative 
bioethics consists then in thinking through the development of an ethics with a fundamental 
attachment to the actuality of life, where the latter always precedes the former. Depend-
ing on the side that the emphasis is placed, bioethics acquires either a more ‘Apollonian’ 
rational or a ‘Dionysian’ vitalistic character, although integrating the two into a synthesis 











(I)  The first thesis is that a bioethics which is a really new approach to ethi-
cal questions and not just an applied ethics requires a concept of life 


















(II) The central problem of bioethics is how the presupposed concept of ‘life’ 
and the concept of philosophical ‘ethics’ can really be combined in a 
systematically acceptable way. This problem becomes acute when con-









other  starts  from something  like sensibility or  indeterminate  feelings about 
what  life,  as  something more  than  rationality, may  teach us. The  first may 





































































identity  of  the  external  and  the  internal,  the  universal  and  the  individual, 
the one and  the many. This  idea will become clearer somewhat  later when 
we consider Hegel and his dialectical concept of life, but let us start with a 
number of general reflections. As has already been mentioned,  life is not a 
simple  ‘object’  of our  reference. We cannot  simply  refer  to  life  and  forget 
that this referring is in itself an act of life. Life is an end in itself and should 
not, therefore, be subjected to finite ends or taken as a mere means. Human 
dignity and its intimate correlation with the individual right to life is stressed, 
e.g.,  in Kant’s  arguments  against  abortion. Abortion means  the destruction 
of an individual real  instance of  life or an already living individual (which 
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2. Kant and the idea of life
Regarding  the  idea of  life, Kant can be considered a somewhat ambiguous 
thinker. On  the one hand,  ‘life’ and ‘living’ constitute something such as a 
‘vital thread’ running right through all of Kant’s philosophy and the develop-
ment of his system. In his first work from 1747 entitled Thoughts on the True 
Estimation of Living Forces,  in which he argues more or  less  in  favour of 
Leibniz’s dynamics, Kant introduces the idea of a vis activa or a ‘living force’ 
as an at  least metaphysically  legitimate concept. Then,  there  is also Kant’s 

























nian law of inertia. In Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
we also have the following:
“Now we know no other  internal principle of a substance  to change  its  state but desire, and 






Life  is,  therefore,  something not  to be  found  in  real,  external  and material 







the  capability of  a being  to  refer  to  itself by external  representations or  in 
a  reflexive way.  Life  is  itself  an  instance  of  reflexivity,  and,  according  to 
Kant,  it  therefore  belongs  to  the  realm of  subjectivity. Thus,  for Kant, we 
ical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right” 
(§28),  in:  Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics 
of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 99. In 
this  sense,  Kant  considers  the  suicide  of  a 
pregnant woman  to be  the murder of a  sec-
ond person; cf. Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysi-
cal First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” 




Kraft”,  “der  seine  Bewegung  in  sich  selber 
hinlänglich gründet, so daß aus seiner inneren 
Bestrebung  hinlänglich  verstanden  werden 
kann, daß er die Bewegung, die er hat,  frei, 
immerwährend und unvermindert ins unend-




Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science, transl. and ed. by Michael Friedman, 






































sence and phenomenon. In his Frankfurt Fragment of a System from 1800 at 
the latest, Hegel tried to show that life has to be understood as a dialectical 
identity of the universal and the individual, the whole and its elements, and 






The model  for  this  living morality and essential unity of  form and content 
in ethics, according to Hegel, is the ancient Greek polis, which for him rep-
resents  the  ideal mediation between  the whole and  the  individual, between 
objective spirit and personality, between laws and their ‘cultural’ embedding. 


















derstood dialectically,  it  is never a simple  ‘object’ of our  reference. We 





an  immediate  “fact”.  It means  a being-in-relations,  and  therefore  refers 
to mediations by which  in every  individual  aspect of  life  the  totality  is 
present,  and  simultaneously  in  every  representation of  the  totality  indi-






kind  of  nominalism which  underlies  transcendental  philosophy  (Kant’s 





acquire our knowledge of  life  from an external point of view, but  from 
inside it. And we know what life is with the immediate certainty that our 
knowing life is itself a demonstration of the reality of what we mean by 









of  self-consciousness does not  lie  in conceiving oneself as an object of 
one’s own consciousness, but in conceiving life and understanding imme-







Friedrich Hegel. Eine Propädeutik,  Marix, 
Wiesbaden 22012, pp. 124–127; Annette Sell, 
Der lebendige Begriff. Leben und Logik bei 
G. W. F. Hegel,  Alber,  Freiburg  –  Munich 
2013.
9
Cf.  Thomas  Sören  Hoffmann,  “Reflexion, 
Begriff  und  spekulative  Erkenntnis.  Über 
Weisen  des  Wissens  im  Blick  auf  Hegels 
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some lectures on bioethical issues under the title The Future of Human Nature 
(Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur).10 Fukuyama, an American economist, 
published a book  in 2002  that  soon became very well-known – Our Post-



































































Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Na-
ture,  Polity  Press,  Cambridge  2003;  Jürgen 










of life and knowing in subjective knowledge has to be considered as the on-







Of course, conflicts will  still  remain, conflicts  regarding  the difference be-
tween freedoms and  the different ways  that  freedoms seek  to become real. 
But these conflicts are not unfamiliar to life, which is itself a rather conflicted 















Filozofski pojam života i njegova uloga 
u zasnivanju jedne integrativne bioetike
Sažetak
U članku se pokazuje kako bioetika može pronaći vlastitu etičku dimenziju i originalan izvor 
normativnosti bacajući iznova pogled na pojam života. Za to je potreban pojam života koji nije 
samo empirijski, a čija je logika izvedena u prvom redu iz uvida do kojih su došli filozofi nje-
mačkog idealizma, ali i iz uvida novije fenomenologije života. Stoga se osnovni problem jedne 
integrativne bioetike sastoji u promišljanju razvoja etike u temeljnoj povezanosti s aktualnošću 
života, gdje ovo drugo prethodi onome prvom. Ovisno o tome na koju se stranu stavlja naglasak, 
bioetika zadobiva ili više »apolonijski« racionalni ili više »dionizijski« vitalistički karakter, 








Der philosophische Begriff des Lebens und 
seine Rolle für die Begründung einer integrativen Bioethik
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag zeigt auf, dass ein neuer Blick auf den Begriff des Lebens und seine Logik der 
Bioethik eine genuine ethische Dimension jenseits nur angewandter Ethik zu geben sowie eine 
eigene Quelle von Normativität zu erschließen vermag. Erforderlich ist dafür der Rückgang auf 
einen mehr als empirisch-objektiven Lebensbegriff, weshalb zunächst auf Einsichten zurückge-
gangen wird, die Kant und die Denker des deutschen Idealismus vorgetragen haben, die aber 
auch in der neueren Phänomenologie wiederkehren. Das Grundproblem einer integrativen Bio-
ethik besteht dann darin, die Spannung zwischen einer sich rational entfaltenden Ethik, die auf 
die Vollzugsgröße „Leben“ bezogen sein will, und dieser letzteren selbst, die aller Entfaltung 
einer „Ethik“ vorausliegt, in angemessener Weise theoretisch einzuholen. Man kann je nach 
Schwerpunkt und Ausrichtung eine „apollinische“ (eher rationalistische) von einer „diony-
sischen“ (eher lebensphilosophischen) Form von Bioethik unterscheiden, wobei das philoso-




Le concept philosophique de vie et ses enjeux  
dans l’établissement  d’une bioéthique intégrative
Résumé
Cet article montre comment la bioéthique peut trouver sa propre dimension éthique et une sour-
ce de normativité originale en jetant un nouveau regard sur le concept de vie. Pour cela, il est 
nécessaire d’avoir un concept de vie qui n’est pas seulement empirique et dont la logique est 
amenée au premier plan à partir de l’examen des philosophes de l’idéalisme allemand, mais 
également à partir de l’examen de la nouvelle phénoménologie de la vie. C’est pourquoi, le 
problème principal d’une bioéthique intégrative consiste en une réflexion sur le développement 
éthique en lien  fondamental avec l’actualité de la vie, où celle-ci précède celui-là. En fonction 
du point sur lequel est mis l’accent, la bioéthique acquiert un caractère  rationnel « apollo-
nien » ou plus vitaliste « dionysiaque », bien que la tâche essentielle soit d’intégrer ces deux 
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Further  reflections  on  the  topic  of  this  pa-
per  can  be  found  in  my  articles:  “Bioethik 
als  Reflexion  des  Lebens.  Prolegomena  zu 
einer  nichtreduktionistischen  Bioethik”,  in: 
Ante	 Čović	 (ed.),	 Integrative Bioethik und 
Pluriperspektivismus. Beiträge des 4. Sü-
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spectivism. Proceedings of the 4th Southeast 
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The Concept of Life in 
Modern Medical Ethics and Bioethics
Abstract
Human persons are characterised by a bodily structure, and not merely as a cluster of 
neurons or as ghosts. The prefix ‘bio’ in ‘bioethics’ already points to that which is alive. Bio-
ethics should therefore always keep in mind this direct relationship between life and the liv-
ing body. The paper discusses two ethical consequences which result from the reduction of 
the human person from an organismic whole to a bodiless mind-brain being: when certain 
mind competencies or brain structures are not, not yet, or no longer identifiable, the legal 
protection and the right to life of such persons have been diminished.
Key words
bioethics, Hans  Jonas,  brain  death,  living  organisms,  personhood,  status  of  the  embryo, 
corporeality (Leiblichkeit)
I. Bioethics and questions of the body 














































II. The danger of a short-sighted understanding of 








































As  absurd  as  it may  sound,  the mind-brain-paradigm  has  been  gaining  in 







poraries  regard  themselves as  lackeys of  the  encephalon,  and no  longer  as 
persons able to express the mental through the (living) body.
The mind-brain-paradigm  results  in  a  gruesome  imbalance:  in  the  case  of 
certain illnesses, only a small aspect of the human being is taken into con-
sideration, and not the human person as a whole (including relatives).4 Tho-












Hans  Jonas, Das Prinzip Leben,  Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt/M.  1997,  p.  149.  [“Der Punkt  des 
Lebens  selber:  dass  es  nämlich  selbst-zen-
trierte  Individualität  ist,  für  sich  seiend  und 
in Gegenstellung gegen alle übrige Welt, mit 
einer  wesentlichen  Grenze  zwischen  Innen 
und Außen.”]
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Cf. Marcus Knaup, Leib und Seele oder mind 
and brain? Zu einem Paradigmenwechsel im 




rowissenschaften  und  Menschenbild”,  Zeit-
schrift für medizinische Ethik, Vol. 52 (2006), 





This  becomes  especially  apparent  in  state-






the  subcortical  limbic networks must,  there-
fore, be the goal of all psychotherapy.” Ger-
hard Roth, “Wie das Gehirn die Seele macht” 
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originated  from  the  sexual  union  of  a man  and  a woman,  IVF or  cloning. 







Cf. M. Knaup, Leib und Seele oder mind and 
brain?, pp. 453–480.
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Bernhard Irrgang, Einführung in die Bioethik, 
UTB, Munich 2005, p. 69.
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Bruno Vollmert, Das Molekül und das Leben. 
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sonales  Denken”,  in:  François-Xavier  Pu-






Einführung in die Bioethik poses the question of whether a zygote is “a hu-
man person  in  the anthropological  sense”,15 and speculates  that  the human 
spirit, subjectivity and the like are only present in rudimentary form and only 
























subjectivity, understood  in  this way,  is  also  the  indicator whether a human 
living being is entitled to legal protection. Embryos as “pre-personal human 
physicality”25 only have a right to a diluted measure of inviolability. In this, 







embryos  and  foetuses  are  not  accorded  any  human dignity  up  to  a  certain 
point in time.27 The “value” of embryos created for research purposes has to 
be appraised in a different way than the ones that have been fertilised in the 
womb.28 This argument in which Irrgang separates a life worth living from a 







































It  is obvious  that  the  life contexts and  faculties of an embryo are different 
Mensch und die Person,  Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2008, p. 65.
15






































This  Aristotelian  thought  is  taken  up  well 
by  Fuat  S.  Oduncu,  “Moralischer  Status 
von Embryonen”,  in: Marcus Düwell, Klaus 





















IV. The dying human person: 

























to coma depassé.  Patients who  found  themselves  in  this  situation were  no 
longer  regarded  as  being  comatose,  they were  now dead. Being  alive was 
reduced to what was or was no longer possible in the cerebrum. Brain death, 
it was agreed, was when physicians could no longer identify any recognisable 












Hans  Jonas was  one  of  the  first  to  voice  concerns  over  this  development: 
through this strategic course of action, a way had been opened to serve the 
interests of transplantation medicine.39 I have already mentioned that, in the 
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My main  concern  has  been  to  draw  attention  to  a  prevalent  point  of  view 
according to which the brain is considered to be that which determines our 
entire personhood and aliveness. Moreover, the brain is sometimes even ex-
pected  to bring  forth our very  selves and  the world  in which we  live. The 
biggest problem with this approach is  that  the living unity disappears from 
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55




H.-P.  Schlake,  K.  Roosen,  Der Hirntod als 




Josef  Seifert,  Das Leib-Seele-Problem und 
die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion. 






Definition,  Criteria,  and  Tests  for  Death”, 





in:  J. Hoff,  J.  in der Schmitten  (eds.), Wann 
ist der Mensch tot?, pp. 51–59; Gerhard Roth, 






H.-P.  Schlake,  K.  Roosen,  Der Hirntod als 




as  the  benchmark:  brain death plus heart 
death plus death of every other indication (H. 
Jonas,  Technik, Medizin und Ethik,  p.  222, 
cf.  p.  233).  “One  can  speak  of  the  death  of 
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Pojam života u 
modernoj medicinskoj etici i bioetici
Sažetak
Ljudske osobe karakterizira tjelesna struktura, što znači da one nisu samo nakupine neurona 
ili duhovi. Već sâm prefiks ‘bio’ u ‘bioetici’ ukazuje na nešto što je živo. Stoga bioetika mora 
uvijek imati u vidu tu vezu između života i živoga tijela. U ovom se radu raspravlja o dvije etičke 
konzekvence koje proizlaze iz reduciranja ljudske osobe kao organizmičke cjeline na tjelesno 
umno-moždano biće: kada se ne može, još ne može ili više ne može ustanoviti određene umne 




Lebensbegriff in der 
modernen medizinischen Ethik und Bioethik
Zusammenfassung
Personen sind leiblich strukturierte Wesen – und kein Neuronenhaufen oder Gespenster. Das 
Prefix ‚Bio‘ in ‚Bioethik‘ verweist uns auf das Lebendige, weshalb Bioethik den Konnex von 
Leben und Leib im Blick haben sollte. Der vorliegende Beitrag beleuchtet zwei ethische Kon-
sequenzen, wenn die organismische Ganzheit zu einem leiblosen mind-brain-Schrumpfwesen 
degradiert wird: Sind bestimmte mind-Befähigungen oder brain-Strukturen nicht, noch nicht 









Le concept de vie dans l’éthique médicale et la bioéthique moderne
Résumé
La structure physique caractérise les personnes humaines, ce qui signifie qu’elles ne sont pas 
seulement un amas de neurones et d’esprits. Déjà simplement le préfixe « bio », dans « bio-
éthique » témoigne de quelque chose de vivant. Pour cela, la bioéthique doit toujours garder en 
vue ce lien entre la vie et le corps vivant. Ce travail traite de deux conséquences éthiques qui 
proviennent d’une réduction de la personne humaine d’un tout organique à un être corporel cé-
rébrale: lorsqu’il n’est pas possible, qu’il n’est pas encore possible ou qu’il n’est plus possible 
d’établir la présence de compétences intellectuelles ou de structures cérébrales déterminées, la 











From the Notion of Life to an Ethics of Life
Abstract
When discussing the concept of life, there is neither a single concept of life, nor absolute 
consensus about a conceptual barycentre, so that consideration of the notion of  life is a 
precondition for establishing and developing an ethics of life, i.e. bioethics. This paper tries 
to sketch the path(s) leading from the notion(s) of life to an ethics of life by recalling some 
remarkable (proto)bioethical conceptions: Hans Jonas’s integrative philosophy of life (philo-
sophical biology and ethics of responsibility), Fritz Jahr’s bio-ethics, Albert Schweitzer’s 
ethics of reverence for life, and Arne Naess’s deep ecology (ecosophy).
Key words
life, bioethics, Hans Jonas, Fritz Jahr, Albert Schweitzer, Arne Naess
1. The meaning of ‘life’
When discussing the concept of life, there is neither a single concept of life, 




















Hans  Werner  Ingensiep,  “Was  ist  Leben? 
– Grundfragen der Biophilosophie”, in: Jahr-


































environmental  conditions,  etc.),  although  the  first  and  crucial  conceptions 
of  bioethics  suggested  something  different. The  conceptual  confusion was 





















situation”,  i.e.,  the context of  the emergence and development of bioethics 
as opposed  to classical  ethics  (and  the worldviews,  cultures,  societies,  and 
SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 
59 (1/2015) pp. (33–46)
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neither bios  nor zoe,  then,  bare  life  emerges 
from  within  this  distinction  and  can  be  de-
fined  as  ‘life  exposed  to  death’,  especially 
in  the  form  of  sovereign  violence”  (ibid.). 
See  also:  Catherine  Mills,  The Philosophy 






sphere of the polis – the politicisation of bare 
life as such – constitutes the decisive event of 
modernity  and  signals  a  radical  transforma-
tion  of  the  political-philosophical  categories 




additional  capacity  for  a  political  existence; 
modern man is an animal whose politics plac-
es his existence as a living being in question” 
(Michel  Foucault,  The History of Sexuality. 
Volume 1: An Introduction, Pantheon Books, 
New York 1978, p. 143).
7
For  the  idea of  integrative bioethics see,  for 
example,	 the	 following	 books:	 Ante	 Čović	
– Thomas Sören Hoffmann (eds.), Integrative 
Bioethik / Integrative Bioethics,  Academia 
Verlag,	 Sankt	 Augustin	 2007;	 Ante	 Čović	
(ed.),  Integrative Bioethik und Pluriper-
spektivismus / Integrative Bioethics and 
Pluri-perspectivism, Academia Verlag, Sankt 
Augustin  2011; Amir Muzur  – Hans-Martin 
Sass  (eds.), Fritz Jahr and the Foundations 
of Global Bioethics. The Future of Integrative 
Bioethics, LIT Verlag, Münster et al. 2012.
8
More  extensive  reflections  on  Hans  Jonas’s 
contributions  to  the  “ethics  of  life”  can  be 
found  in my paper  “Hans  Jonas’  Integrative 
Philosophy of Life as a Foothold for Integra-
tive  Bioethics”,  in: A. Muzur  – H.-M.  Sass 
(eds.),  Fritz Jahr and the Foundations of 
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The ethical  implications of Jonas’s philosophy of  life are clearly  indicated. 

















“Bio-ethics: Reviewing  the Ethical Relations  of Humans  towards Animals 
and Plants”.20



































vornosti Hansa Jonasa (Hans Jonas’s Ethics 
of Responsibility), Pergamena, Zagreb 2010.
9
See Hans  Jonas, The Imperative of Respon-
sibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Techno-
logical Age,  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
Chicago 1984.
10
See Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. To-
ward a Philosophical Biology, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 2001.
11
Hans  Jonas, Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. 
Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann in der Reihe 























and the Foundations of Global Bioethics, as 
well as  the book, published  in Croatian,  Iva 
Rinčić	 –	Amir	Muzur,	Fritz Jahr i rađanje 
europske bioetike (Fritz Jahr and the Emer-




Relations  of  Humans  towards Animals  and 
Plants”,  in: A.  Muzur  –  H.-M.  Sass  (eds.), 
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Jahr  present  his  “categorical  imperative”  as  the  “bio-ethical  imperative”, 
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2.3. Albert Schweitzer’s ethics of reverence for life
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Fritz Jahr and the Foundations of Global 
Bioethics, p. 33.
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much less evil than thoughtless exploitation, torture, and killing. Anyhow, we 
should be aware of  the fact  that we, as humans,  live not only  in  the human 
world, but also in the natural world, in the world of living nature, which has its 
own dignity, or at least value, which should be recognised and respected.
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Bill  Devall  –  George  Sessions, Deep Ecology. 
































scheme  the  traditional concept of human dignity, which  includes  the  tradi-
tional concepts of freedom and autonomy, as well as the ability and the right 





































cal  duties,  although  it would  have  to  emphasise  exactly  the  basic  equality 






































anthropomorphism”  in:  H.  Jonas,  The Phe-
nomenon of Life, especially pp. 33–37.
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4. The ‘exhibition’ of life
By recalling Jonas, Jahr, Schweitzer and Naess, we can at least conclude that 









              profits, conformities,
Which too long I was offering to feed my soul,
Clear to me now standards not yet publish’d, clear to me




              yet contains all the rest (…).”51
A differently set approach to life – which can also be found in Jonas, Jahr, 
Schweitzer and Naess – could start with a Whitmanian “phenomenological 
reduction” of  life  to “life  that does not exhibit  itself”  through  the matrices 


























See,  for  example,  the  chapter  “Emotion, 
Value,  and  Reality”  bringing  the  following 
passage:  “In  a  discussion  of  value  thinking, 
it  is  essential  to  clarify  the  relationship  be-
tween spontaneous feelings, their expression 
through  our  vibrant  voices,  and  statements 
of  value  or  announcement  of  norms  moti-
vated by  strong  feelings  but  having  a  clear 
cognitive  function.  (…)  In  these  statements, 
feelings are closely tied to intention. (…) In 
short,  value  statements  are  normally  made 
with positive or negative feeling, and it would 
be nonsensical to ask for neutrality. (…) It is 
thus  unwarranted  to  require  that  feeling  be 
eliminated  in  an  impartial  discussion.  If  the 
debate  is  to proceed  in depth,  these  feelings 
should be clarified, and made explicit as the 
need  arises.  Specific  personal,  idiosyncratic 
components must be sorted out if the debate is 
concerned with more or less general norms.” 




tive  of  the  idea  of  animal  protection”,  Jahr 
says  that  “compassion  with  animals  shows 
up  as  an  empirically  given  phenomenon  of 
the human soul” (Fritz Jahr, “Animal Protec-
tion and Ethics”, in: A. Muzur – H.-M. Sass, 







A. Schweitzer, Indian Thought and Its Devel-
opment, p. 84.
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Leonardo  Boff,  Essential Care. An Ethics 
of Human Nature,  Baylor  University  Press, 
Waco 2008, p. 14.
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all  the  circumstances  and  all  the  aspirations 
of  the will  to  live,  its  pleasure,  too,  and  its 





Works of Walt Whitman,  Wordsworth  Edi-
tions, Ware 1995, p. 106.
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Hrvoje Jurić
Od pojma života do etike života
Sažetak
Nema jednog i jedinstvenog pojma života, a nema ni apsolutnog konsenzusa oko konceptualnog 
težišta u raspravama o pojmu života, tako da je razmatranje pojma	života preduvjet utemeljenja 
i razvijanja etike	života, tj. bioetike. U ovom radu nastojimo ocrtati put koji vodi od pojma 
života do etike života, uzimajući u obzir nekoliko upečatljivih (proto)bioetičkih koncepcija: inte-
grativnu filozofiju života (filozofijsku biologiju i etiku odgovornosti) Hansa Jonasa, bio-etiku 





Vom Lebensbegriff bis zu einer Ethik des Lebens
Zusammenfassung
Es gibt keinen einen und einzigartigen Lebensbegriff, und es gibt keinen absoluten Konsens 
über den konzeptuellen Schwerpunkt in den Abhandlungen über den Lebensbegriff, sodass die 
Betrachtung des Lebensbegriffs eine Vorbedingung zur Grundlegung und Entwicklung einer 
Ethik des Lebens bzw. Bioethik ist. In dieser Arbeit streben wir an, den Weg vom Lebensbegriff 
bis zu einer Lebensethik auszumalen, indem wir etliche einprägsame (proto)bioethische Kon-
zeptionen berücksichtigen: integrative Philosophie des Lebens (philosophische Biologie und 
Verantwortungsethik) Hans Jonas’, Bio-Ethik Fritz Jahrs, Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben 




Du concept de vie à l’éthique de vie
Résumé
Il n’y a pas un seul et unique concept de vie, et il n’y a pas non plus de consensus absolu autour 
du noyau conceptuel dans les débats sur le concept de vie, de telle manière que l’examen de 
ce concept est une précondition pour fonder et développer une éthique de vie, à savoir une 
bioéthique. Nous nous appliquons dans ce travail à tracer le chemin qui mène du concept de 
vie au concept éthique de vie, en prenant en considération quelques conceptions sensibles de 
(proto)bioéthique: la philosophie intégrative de la vie (la biologie philosophique et l’éthique de 
responsabilité) de Hans Jonas, la bioéthique de Fritz Jahr, l’éthique du respect de la vie d’Al-








Is There an Intrinsic Worth in Animal Life?
Abstract
The article argues that moral autonomy and dignity as intrinsic values are borne only by 
members of mankind, and not by nonhuman animals. Although humans and animals inevit-
ably cohabit nature, they cannot be considered to be united together within a moral commu-
nity. However, animal life and formidable biological diversity are definitely worthy of exist-
ence on our planet, even if one day mankind vanishes from Earth. While animals are clearly 
not agents, they may well be recipients of moral obligations to be met by human agency. 
Treating animals in a decent way is a moral duty to ourselves. Following Kant, this duty is 
justifiable on the grounds that the animal world exhibits a certain analogy to mankind. Cau-
tious concern for the natural world strengthens then our worth as rational beings.
Key words
humans, animals, autonomy, dignity, intrinsic worth, Immanuel Kant
1. Animals are not persons
Since time immemorial, nature has been traversed by multiple processes of 
evolution. The human species, too, has evolved impressively within it along 
the centuries. What  can be  termed as  the value of nature  is  something ap-
praised and ascribed to nature by human perception and conscience.















See  Onora  O’Neill,  “Necessary  Anthro-
pocentrism  and  Contingent  Speciesism”, 
Symposium  on  “Kant  on  Duties  Regarding 
Non-Rational  Nature”,  Proceedings of the 










nise animals as quasi-moral  agents.3 This  strange elevation  is, nonetheless, 







































But,  if we  take  the moral  significance  of  inalienable worth  seriously,  then 
no comparative assessment of worth is morally acceptable between singular 
bearers of dignity and rights. The  intelligible moral dignity of each person 
as an equal member of humanity is one thing, and it is quite another thing to 
make evaluative considerations on the basis of actual individual abilities and 








































matischer Hinsicht,  Felix  Meiner  Verlag, 
Hamburg 2000, §1, p. 9 (Ak. VII, 127).
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See,  for  instance, Tom Regan, The Case for 









Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. Dis-
ability, Nationality, Species Membership, 






See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation. A New 
Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals,  New 
York  Review  –  Random  House,  New York 
1975, especially chapter 1.
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Immanuel  Kant,  The Moral Law.  Ground-
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In  being  conscious  of  their moral  autonomy,  human beings  shape  a moral 





































       A person who keeps to these duties possesses rightful honour. Honestas 











his own master beyond reproach. The  implied moral capacity forms  the 
second fundament of human dignity from the angle of right. Thus, dignity 
becomes  a  grounding  principle  of  justifying acquired  rights,  as well  as 
external duties, prescribed by law.




























assumption,  however,  it  does  not  follow  that  humans  are morally  allowed 
to treat animals in all possible ways, unlimitedly and without restraint. Our 
moral obligations towards animals are in general congruous with their own 
animal nature. A range of these obligations also includes a positive exigency 
for good conditions of animal welfare.
On the face of it, both statements are forceful. Animals do indeed have ob-
servable needs, which men and women ought to take seriously into account, 
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3. There is no moral community 
  between humans and animals
Peter Singer argues that the moral principle of equality between humans ob-























which  is  related  to  empirically  detectable  characteristics  of,  for  example, 
animal species. Instead, it consists in the idea of reason (Vernunft) as to the 







Kant  diagnoses  with  sincerity  that  humans  and  animal  species  are  indeed 
somewhat  equated  under  the  genus  of  living organisms.20  If  externally 






















Even with  the most charitable  judgement of nonhuman beings, no  form of 
animal life can reach a self-determined subjectivity vested with the freedom of 

































Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 




















4. Animal life has an immense value of existence
Animal life and nature have an immensely useful value, immediate or virtual, 











biocentric  standpoint holds  that nature has a value  in  itself  (worth)  simply 
because  it exists as a heavenly body  in  the universe. Supporters of  the so-
called Deep Ecology have preached that there is an element of tremendous 









importance of  these purposes on  the one hand, and  to  the possibility of 
ordinary rejuvenation in nature on the other.
b)  Scientific research of biological diversity and of the natural world enhances 




















cern for the natural world invigorates our worth as rational beings.26 There-











5. A set of basic moral requirements regarding animals
Our moral  duty  to  protect  nature  stems  from  an  intractable  prerogative  of 
mankind. While we are the sole animal species with a moral conscience, we 
are also the species par excellence that damages nature and animal life in 
irresponsible ways.





within  a  framework of  existent,  possible  or  desirable  relationships with 
them.
b)  Human  agents,  of  course,  have  the  tendency  to  experience  compassion 




















Cf.  Thomas  E.  Hill,  “Ideals  of  Human  Ex-




I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, part one, 
pp. 223–224 (353).
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See  Paul  Guyer,  Kant,  Routledge,  London 
– New York 2006, pp. 355–357.
27
I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, part two, 
§ 22 (§83), p. 95 (432).
28
The  rival  position  is  propounded  by  Julian 
Franklin, Animal Rights and Moral Philoso-
phy,  Columbia  University  Press,  New York 
2005, pp. 77f.
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d)  This duty  is  justifiable on  the grounds  that  the animal world exhibits a 
certain analogy to mankind.31 Behaving in mild and humane ways towards 
animals actually involves a duty commensurate with what we owe human-
ity. Moreover, protecting defenceless beings in nature, just as within the 




constitution.  Hurting  animals  diminishes  unnecessarily  and  greatly  our 
preoccupation  with  acting  rightfully  towards  our  fellow  humans  them-
selves; whoever  utilises  animals  brutally  is  usually  gruesome  in  his/her 
behaviour towards men, women and children as well.





























ings. An adequate protection of Nature could come to fruition in a teleological 

























Franklin, Julian, Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy, Columbia University Press, New 
York 2005.
Guyer, Paul, Kant, Routledge, London – New York 2006.
Hill, Thomas E.,  “Ideals  of Human Excellence  and Preserving Natural Environments”, 
Environmental Ethics 5.3 (1996), pp. 211–224.
Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Judgement, ed. by James Creed Meredith, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1952.
Kant,  Immanuel, “Der Streit der Fakultäten”,  in:  Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Anthro-
pologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, Vol. 1, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frank-
furt/M 1977.
Kant, Immanuel, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1996.
Kant, Immanuel, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 
2000.
Kant,  Immanuel, Lectures on Ethics,  ed.  by  Peter Heath, Cambridge University  Press, 
Cambridge 2001.













Michael  Pollan,  The Omnivore’s Dilemma, 
Penguin Press, New York 1994, pp. 320–322.
36




end  of  nature  as  a  teleological  system”;  I. 








Nussbaum,  Martha,  Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) – London 2007.
O’Neill, Onora, “Necessary Anthropocentrism and Contingent Speciesism”, Symposium 
on “Kant on Duties Regarding Non-Rational Nature”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian So-
ciety, Vol. LXXIII (1998b), pp. 221–228.
Pollan, Michael, The Omnivore’s Dilemma, Penguin Press, New York 1994.
Regan, Tom, The Case for Animal Rights,  2nd  edition, University  of California  Press, 
Berkeley 2004.
Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation. A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, New York 
Review – Random House, New York 1975.
Constantin Stamatis
Ima li život životinjâ intrinzičnu vrijednost?
Sažetak
U članku se nude argumenti za tezu da samo pripadnici ljudskoga roda, a ne i ne-ljudske živo-
tinje, imaju moralnu autonomiju i dostojanstvo kao intrinzičnu vrijednost. Premda je kohabi-
tacija ljudi i životinja u prirodi neizbježna, njih se ne može smatrati članovima jedne moralne 
zajednice. Međutim, život životinjâ i zastrašujuća biološka raznolikost svakako su vrijedni po-
stojanja na našem planetu, čak i ako bi jednoga dana ljudski rod nestao sa Zemlje. Iako životinje 
zasigurno nisu subjekti, one bi mogle biti objekti moralnih dužnosti koje ljudsko djelovanje 
mora uvažiti. Primjereno postupanje sa životinjama moralna je dužnost prema nama samima. 
Slijedeći Kanta, ovu se dužnost može opravdati na temelju tvrdnje da životinjski svijet pokazuje 
određenu sličnost s ljudskim svijetom. U tom smislu, oprezni obzir spram prirodnoga svijeta 




Hat das Leben der Tiere einen intrinsischen Wert?
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel werden Argumente vorgebracht für die These, lediglich Angehörige des Men-
schengeschlechts, und nicht auch die nicht-menschlichen Tiere, hätten moralische Autonomie 
und Würde als einen intrinsischen Wert. Wenngleich die Kohabitation zwischen Menschen 
und Tieren in der Natur unvermeidlich ist, können sie nicht als Mitglieder einer moralischen 
Gemeinschaft erachtet werden. Allerdings sind das Leben der Tiere und die fürchterliche bio-
logische Vielfalt einer Existenz auf unserem Planeten durchaus wert, selbst wenn das Men-
schengeschlecht eines Tages von der Erde verschwinden würde. Obwohl Tiere sicherlich keine 
Subjekte sind, könnten sie Objekte moralischer Pflichten sein, die das menschliche Tun wert-
schätzen muss. Eine angemessene Behandlung der Tiere ist eine moralische Pflicht gegenüber 
uns selbst. Diese Pflicht kann, Kant folgend, aufgrund der Behauptung gerechtfertigt werden, 
die Tierwelt weise eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit mit der Menschenwelt auf. In diesem Sinne stärkt 








La vie des animaux a-t-elle une valeur intrinsèque?
Résumé
L’article propose des arguments en faveur de la thèse selon laquelle seuls les membres du genre 
humain, et non les animaux non humains, ont une autonomie morale et une dignité comme va-
leur intrinsèque. Bien que la cohabitation des êtres humains et des animaux dans la nature soit 
inévitable, ces derniers ne peuvent être considérés comme membres d’une communauté morale. 
Cependant, la vie des animaux et l’effrayante diversité biologique ont absolument une valeur 
d’existence sur notre planète, et cela même si le genre humain vient à disparaître de notre Terre. 
Bien que les animaux ne soient certes pas des sujets, ils peuvent être des objets de devoirs mo-
raux que l’activité humaine doit valoriser. Une approche adéquate envers les animaux constitue 
un devoir moral envers nous-mêmes. Suivant la trace de Kant, ce devoir peut être justifié sur 
la base de l’affirmation selon laquelle le monde animal présente une certaine similarité avec le 
monde humain. En ce sens, une considération avisée envers le monde naturel renforce la valeur 










Autonomy and Duties regarding 
Non-Human Nature1
Abstract
The paper makes an effort to present a view that answers objections put forward by many 
philosophers that Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature does not ground 
adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. In doing so, I reject what I call 
the “psychological” interpretation of duties regarding non-human nature, and try to follow 
the “moral perfection” interpretation supported by Kant’s texts. The latter interpretation 
is, in my view, also present in a reading of our intellectual interest in natural beauty found 
in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Finally, after I consider some objections, I assess Kant’s 
contribution to environmental ethics: (a) despite his anthropocentric approach, Kant does 
not domesticate non-human nature as biocentrism does, and (b) even if his approach can 
be characterised as speciesist, Kant does not see nature as a mere instrument – either as 















the  imperfect duty  to foster our own moral perfection,  that  is, our capacity 
for autonomy. At first glance, this seems somehow paradoxical. How can au-




I  thank  the  participants  of  the  Bioethics in 
Context II Summer School (Rethymno, Crete, 
31 August  –  13 September 2013)  for  quest-











II. The “psychological interpretation” of 
   Kant’s duties regarding non-human nature
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of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Wal-
ter  de Gruyter  and Co.,  1900–) with  volume 
and page numbers followed by the pagination 
in  the English  translations  of  his works:  Im-
manuel Kant, [1785] Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals, in: The Cambridge Edition 
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As  argued  in  Religion,  the  predisposition  to 
personality should be considered  to be a pre-
disposition  of  the  human  species.  In  the An-











Kant’s Metaphysics  of  Morals:  A Critical 
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sense, Kant only advises us to abstain from animal cruelty and the destruction 

































Now,  this  imperfect duty  to  increase one’s moral perfection should be dis-





















































Environmental Ethics: An Anthology,  Mal-
den:  Blackwell,  2003,  pp.  55–64;  Tom  Re-




Matthew C. Altman, Kant and Applied Ethics: 




there  is  really  nothing  morally  ascribable 








it  is  fully  determinate what  constitutes  their 
fulfillment  (usually  omissions)”  and  imper-
fect duties as “those duties the fulfillment of 
which (usually commissions) is indeterminate 
and  therefore  leaves open  to  judgment what 
actions  and  how much  is  required  for  their 
fulfillment”; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Expe-





P. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Free-
dom,  pp.  324–329.  See  also  Allen  Wood, 
“Kant on Duties  regarding Non-Human Na-
ture”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 






















































tion. One  is  the unwillingness  to accept  that beauty  is absent  from nature, 
which  indicates  a  desire  to  view,  but  also  to preserve nature,  even  at  the 
personal cost of suffering some kind of harm. The other is that the immediate 
interest  is not an empirical  interest but an intellectual one. Taken together, 
they  seem  to  entail  a  duty  to  seek  and  preserve  natural  beauty. Now,  this 
immediate  interest,  says Kant,  is  immediate because  it  is not mediated by 
an empirical interest or intention. This seems actually to be akin to a moral 
interest, and it goes along with his account of the moral law which provides 
























chological  interpretation”  of  our  duties  regarding  non-human  nature,  that 
is, that they are grounded on a duty to preserve and promote aspects of our 
sensibility favourable to morality, that is, our conduct towards other human 
beings, while  intellectual  interest  in natural beauty  is not, by  itself,  such a 














The  argument  presented here  owes much  to 
the  presentation  in  Joseph  Cannon,  “Nature 
as  the  School  of  the Moral World: Kant  on 
Taking  an  Interest  in  Natural  Beauty”,  in: 
William  P.  Kabasenche, Michael  O’Rourke, 





























































some of his other writings, particularly the Idea of a Universal History from 
a Cosmopolitan Point of View, Towards Perpetual Peace and Anthropology 









































IV. Kant’s contribution to environmental ethics: 










Dieter Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the 





Beautiful  forms  are  like  ciphers  through 
which  nature  “speaks  to  us”  in  a  figurative 
way (CJ, 5:301, 168).
38
What  is designed in  this way makes  its pur-
posiveness  knowable  in  principle  and,  thus, 
subject to our control.
39







The  notion  of  ‘analogy’  is  developed  in 
CJ, par. 59.  It does not signify an  imperfect 
similarity  between  two  things,  but  a  perfect 
similarity of relations between two quite dis-
similar  things.  See  also  Howard  Caygill,  A 










relates  to  tornadoes,  volcanoes  and war. We 
can  recognise  there  our  physical  impotence, 








Indeed,  Kant  could  not  have  ever  imagined 
our  immense  impact  on  biodiversity  or  cli-




mate  Change”,  in:  Denis  G.  Arnold  (ed.), 
The Ethics of Global Climate Change, Cam-









































































ourselves. Yet,  it  is not vulnerable  to anthropomorphism, because  this kind 
of relation does not domesticate nature, but brings us closer to it by regard-
ing it as a proper object of love and sympathy, albeit not respect. Even if his 
approach  can be  characterised  as  speciesist, Kant  does not  see nature  as  a 
mere instrument – either as “natural capital” or “natural resource” – common 







Autonomija i dužnosti prema ne-ljudskoj prirodi
Sažetak
U članku se nastoji prikazati gledište koje odgovara na primjedbe mnogih filozofa da Kantovo 
shvaćanje dužnosti prema ne-ljudskoj prirodi nije odgovarajuća osnovica za utemeljenje moral-
noga obzira prema ne-ljudskim prirodnim entitetima. Time opovrgavam ono što nazivam »psi-
hološkom« interpretacijom dužnosti prema ne-ljudskoj prirodi te pokušavam slijediti interpreta-
ciju na osnovi »moralnog usavršavanja«, koja se zasniva na Kantovim tekstovima. Smatram da 
se ovu drugu interpretaciju može izvesti i iz našeg umskog interesa za prirodnu ljepotu, kako je 
on prikazan u Kantovoj Kritici	moći	suđenja. Naposljetku, nakon što razmotrim neke prigovore, 
osvrćem se na Kantov doprinos ekološkoj etici: (a) bez obzira na njegov antropocentrički pri-
45
Jens Timmermann, “When the Tail Wags the 
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Fredrik  Karlsson,  “Critical  Anthropomor-
phism and Animal Ethics”, Journal of Agri-
cultural and Environmental Ethics,  Vol.  25 
(2012), No. 5, pp. 707–720.
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See  also  Filimon  Peonidis,  “Kant’s  Not  So 
Bad  Speciesism”,  in:  Evangelos  D.  Proto-
papadakis  (ed.),  Animal Ethics: Past and 
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stup, Kant ne pripitomljava ne-ljudsku prirodu kao što to čini biocentrizam, te (b) iako se njegov 
pristup može označiti kao speciesistički, Kant ne gleda na prirodu kao na puko sredstvo – bilo 
kao na »prirodni kapital« ili kao na »prirodni resurs« – nego je smatra nečim što je neophodno 




Autonomie und Pflichten gegenüber der nicht-menschlichen Natur
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel ist man bestrebt, den Blickwinkel darzustellen, der auf die Einwendungen vieler-
lei Philosophen erwidert, wonach Kants Auffassung der Pflichten gegenüber der nicht-mensch-
lichen Natur keine entsprechende Basis zur Gründung der moralischen Rücksicht gegenüber 
den nicht-menschlichen natürlichen Entitäten ist. Damit widerlege ich jenes, was ich „psy-
chologische“ Interpretation der Pflichten gegenüber der nicht-menschlichen Natur nenne, und 
versuche der Interpretation auf der Basis „moralischer Vervollkommnung“ zu folgen, welche 
auf Kants Texten aufbaut. Nach meinem Erachten lässt sich diese zweite Interpretation auch 
aus unserem intellektuellen Interesse an der Schönheit der Natur herleiten, wie dieses in Kants 
Kritik der Urteilskraft geschildert wird. Schließlich, nachdem ich einige Einwände in Betracht 
gezogen habe, blicke ich zurück auf Kants Beitrag zur ökologischen Ethik: (a) Ungeachtet sei-
nes anthropozentrischen Ansatzes zähmt Kant die nicht-menschliche Natur nicht in der Art, wie 
es der Biozentrismus tut und (b) Obgleich sich sein Ansatz als speziesistisch bezeichnen lässt, 
nimmt Kant die Natur nicht als bloßes Mittel in Augenschein – sei es als „natürliches Kapital“, 
sei es als „natürliche Ressource“ – sondern sieht sie als Unentbehrlichkeit für unsere mora-
lische Vervollkommnung an.
Schlüsselwörter
Immanuel Kant,  nicht-menschliche Natur,  Pflichten, moralische Vervollkommnung,  Schönheit  der 
Natur, Zähmung
Kostas Koukouzelis
Autonomie et devoirs envers la nature non humaine
Résumé
Cet article tente de montrer le point de vue qui répond aux remarques de nombreux philosophes 
selon lesquels, la conception de Kant du devoir envers la nature non humaine ne constitue pas 
une base adéquate pour fonder un respect morale envers les entités naturelles non humaines. 
Par là, je réfute ce que j’appelle l’interprétation « psychologique » du devoir envers la nature 
non humaine et je tente de suivre une interprétation basée sur la « perfectibilité morale » qui se 
fonde sur les textes kantiens. J’estime que cette deuxième interprétation peut se déduire de notre 
intérêt intellectuel pour la beauté naturelle, à la manière dont il est démontré dans la Critique 
de la faculté de juger de Kant. Enfin, après avoir examiné quelques objections, je me tournerai 
vers la contribution kantienne à l’éthique écologique : (a) sans prendre en considération son 
approche anthropocentrique, Kant ne subordonne pas la nature non humaine comme le fait le 
biocentrisme, et (b) bien que son approche puisse être désignée comme étant spéciste, Kant ne 
regarde pas la nature comme simple moyen – comme « capital naturel » ou comme « ressource 











The Principle of Autonomy and 
the Ethics of Advance Directives
Abstract
Advance directives are conceptualised as a means of increasing “patient autonomy”, as 
they enforce individuals’ power of choice over a post-competence dying process. There is, 
however, controversy over their moral force. Rebecca Dresser and John Robertson offer a 
conceptual argument grounded in epistemological considerations concerning personhood 
which challenges their authority. Roland Dworkin defends forcefully “precedent autono-
my” in planning post-competence medical care. This paper examines the above opposing 
theses and assesses their main arguments. Limitations are detected in both. Regarding the 
former, its conceptualisation of the notion of personhood is found to be problematic, and 
regarding the latter, its conception of individual autonomy is found to be too narrow. An 
alternative route is explored by reconstructing Kant’s conception of moral autonomy. It 
provides a framework for moral reasoning, from which certain contemporary understand-
ings of autonomy as a right, as a reflective capacity of the individual, as responsibility and 
integrity can be properly assessed and justified. Normative conclusions follow regarding 





















(bio)ethical discussions. They highlight  the  importance of being  in  control 






























What  are  the moral  grounds  for  honouring  advance directives  and what  is 










a. The Dresser and Robertson thesis: 












































current best  interests of  the now  incompetent or marginally  competent pa-






Rebecca  S.  Dresser,  John  A.  Robertson, 
“Quality  of  Life  and  Non-Treatment  Deci-
sions  for  Incompetent  Patients:  A  Critique 
of  the  Orthodox Approach”,  Law, Medicine 
& Health Care,  Vol.  17  (1989),  No.  3,  pp. 
234–244 (239).
2
Derek  Parfit, Reasons and Persons,  Oxford 
University  Press,  Oxford  1984.  Parfit’s  ap-
proach  has  invigorated  the  18th  century 
Lockean  tradition.  John  Locke  proposes  a 
relational  view  of  personal  identity  as  op-










to  X  (John  Locke,  “Of  Identity  and  Diver-













































in which  there  is psychological connectedness between  the different stages 
of one’s life, why should one’s preferences or wishes (contemporaneous or 
advance) bind another’s action (the surrogate’s or anyone else’s)? The transi-
tion  from  factual  premises  about  psychology  (facts  about  preferences  and 
other mental states) to normative conclusions about moral commitment (what 
ought to be done) is epistemologically questionable.
b. Ronald Dworkin: Autonomy as integrity
A different response to the moral authority of advance instruction comes from 

























































Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Crimi-






















R. Dworkin,  “Autonomy  and  the Demented 
Self”, p. 13.
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life,  including autonomous  living. However,  two premises  in his  argument 














– while  agreeing with Dworkin  about  the  normative  dominance  of  critical 
interests over experiential ones – understands persons with dementia as still 
capable of generating new critical interests, including those about the value 







interests  can  stem  from  simpler  second-order  desires,  and  that  convictions 
about what is good to have do not require the ability to grasp or reflect upon 
one’s life as a whole.
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gins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 



















































































binding,  individual-transcending  aspect  in  our moral  relations.  It  is  firmly 
grounded  in Kant’s conception of morality, characterising principles as au-
tonomous if and only if the reasons for acting on them could be adopted by 
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tive  Choice”,  in:  John  Harris,  Soren  Holm 
(eds.), The Future of Human Reproduction: 
Ethics, Choice, and Regulation,  Clarendon 
Press, Oxford  1998;  Julian  Savulescu,  “Au-
tonomy,  the  Good  Life  and  Controversial 
Choices”,  in:  Rosamond  Rhodes,  Leslie  P. 
Francis, Anita  Silvers  (eds.),  The Blackwell 
Guide to Medical Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford 
2007,  pp.  17–37;  John  Robertson, Children 





















Respecting persons’  autonomy  in  the Kantian  sense  is  not  just  a matter  of 
giving them effective options and assisting them in achieving some of them, 
but making decisions in which they (and all others) could rationally join in. 









Integral  to Kant’s  notion  of  autonomy  is  the  common  human  perspective. 
Morality as autonomy is about our relations with others (abiding by self-leg-
islated principles valid from the standpoint of all). If this is so, if morality is 
interpersonal  in  the above sense,  then  to speak of  the moral  importance of 
personal autonomy implies that it has a role in interpersonal relations. The in-
dividual-transcending dimension of morality is captured by Kant as follows:





























































agency  follow  from  the above conception of moral  autonomy. Kant’s  con-
ceptual argument is that autonomy is constitutive of moral agency, and this 
is  independent of our beliefs about which human creatures are, empirically 
speaking, moral  agents. Although we  cannot  consider  severely  brain-dam-
aged or  demented  human beings  as  responsive  to moral  reasons,  they  are, 









Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Ver-
nunft [KpV],  (1788),  in: Kant’s Gesammelte 
Schriften,  Königlich-Preußische  Akademie 
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lish  translation:  Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
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The unity of personhood and 
the authority of advance directives






ance. This  implies  that we  too remain uncertain about  the degree  to which 
others, mature adult  individuals, express their personal autonomy. We need 





not deprive  them of being members of humanity,  the  community of moral 
agents. Even when someone is in a persistent vegetative state, there are still 




























So  long  as  the directive  reflects  a  considered  and unambiguous  awareness 





morally  speaking. A world  in which  rational  decisions were  not  respected 
after  the  loss of  (empirical) competence or even  the death of  the person  in 
question would show less than respect for humanity and would be less than a 
“realm of ends”.
































Paul  T.  Menzel,  “Advance  Directives,  De-
mentia, and Eligibility for Physician-Assisted 
Death”,  58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 321  (2013–
2014),  p.  339;  see  also  Nancy  K.  Rhoden, 






























as  unforeseeable  future  advances  in  medical  technologies  and  therapeutic 
methods. Practical decisions have to be taken with extreme care and caution, 
by paying careful attention  to  the complexities of willing something  in  the 












Lastly,  discussions  about  the morality of  end-of-life  choices  should not be 
reduced merely to claims about advance directives and “patient autonomy”. 
Advance directives have moral force in their own right. But their moral au-
thority  cannot  compromise  or minimise  the  doctors’  and  health  providers’ 
responsibility to protect the “humanity”, basic rights and interests of the ter-









Princip autonomije i 
etika smjernica za postupanje na kraju života
Sažetak
Smjernice za postupanje na kraju života (advance directives) zamišljene su kao sredstvo pove-
ćavanja »autonomije pacijenta« jer one osnažuju moć izbora pojedinca  u post-kompetentnom 
procesu umiranja. No njihova je moralna snaga sporna. Rebecca Dresser i John Robertson 
nude konceptualni argument utemeljen u epistemološkim razmatranjima osobnosti koja ospo-
ravaju autoritet smjernica. Ronald Dworkin snažno brani »prethodnu autonomiju« u planira-
nju post-kompetentne medicinske skrbi. Ovaj rad istražuje gore navedene suprotstavljene teze 
i ocjenjuje njihove glavne argumente. U oba su slučaja ustanovljena određena ograničenja. S 
obzirom na prvu tezu, problematičnom se smatra njezina konceptualizacija pojma osobnosti, a 
što se tiče druge, smatra se da je njezin koncept individualne autonomije suviše uzak. Alternativ-
ni se put traži kroz rekonstruiranje Kantova shvaćanja moralne autonomije. Time se nudi okvir 
za moralno rasuđivanje iz kojega se može primjereno izvesti i opravdati određeno suvremeno 
razumijevanje autonomije kao prava, kao refleksivne sposobnosti pojedinca, kao odgovornosti 
i integriteta. Normativni zaključci proizlaze iz proširenja osobne autonomije u napredni medi-
cinski izbor. 
Ključne riječi
smjernice	 za	 postupanje	 na	 kraju	 života	 (advance directives),  djelovanje,  autonomija,  Rebecca 
Dresser, Ronald Dworkin, Immanuel Kant, osobnost, poštovanje
Stavroula Tsinorema
Prinzip der Autonomie und Ethik der Patientenverfügung
Zusammenfassung
Die Patientenverfügung (advance directives) ist als Mittel zur Vergrößerung der „Patientenau-
tonomie“ gedacht, weil sie die Macht der individuellen Wahl innerhalb des post-kompetenten 
Sterbeprozesses kräftigt. Jedoch ist deren moralische Kraft umstritten. Rebecca Dresser und 
John Robertson unterbreiten ein konzeptuelles Argument, das sich auf epistemologischen Be-
trachtungen der Personalität gründet, die die Autorität der Patientenverfügung anfechten. 
Ronald Dworkin verteidigt mit aller Kraft die „vorherige Autonomie“ in der Planung der 
post-kompetenten medizinischen Betreuung. Diese Arbeit untersucht die oben angeführten ent-
gegengesetzten Thesen und bewertet ihre Hauptargumente. In beiden Fällen wurden gewisse 
Beschränkungen festgestellt. In Anbetracht der ersten These wird ihre Konzeptualisierung des 
Personalitätsbegriffs für problematisch befunden, und was die andere angeht, wird ihr Kon-
zept der individuellen Autonomie als übertrieben schmal beurteilt. Ein alternativer Weg wird 
durch die Rekonstruktion von Kants Auffassung der moralischen Autonomie gesucht. Dadurch 
wird ein Rahmen zum moralischen Ermessen angeboten, aus dem sich ein bestimmtes zeitge-
nössisches Verständnis der Autonomie als Recht passend ableiten und rechtfertigen lässt, ein 
Verständnis der Autonomie als reflexive Fähigkeit des Individuums, als Verantwortung und In-
tegrität. Normative Schlussfolgerungen gehen aus der Ausdehnung der persönlichen Autonomie 












Le principe d’autonomie et 
une éthique des directives anticipées
Résumé
Les directives anticipées (advance directives) ont été conçues comme un moyen pour augmenter 
« l’autonomie du patient » puisqu’elles renforcent son pouvoir décisionnel une fois le proces-
sus de fin de vie entamé, c’est-à-dire une fois les compétences diminuées. Toutefois, leur force 
morale est discutable. Rebecca Dresser et John Robertson proposent des arguments tirés de 
considérations épistémologiques de la personnalité qui contestent l’autorité des directives. Ro-
nald Dworkin défend vigoureusement « l’autonomie antérieure » dans la planification des soins 
médicaux « post-compétents ». Ce travail examine les thèses adverses mentionnées ci-dessus et 
évalue leurs arguments principaux. Dans les deux cas, des limitations déterminées sont établies. 
Concernant la première thèse, la conceptualisation de la notion de personnalité est jugée pro-
blématique, et quant à la seconde thèse, son concept d’autonomie individuelle est estimé bien 
trop étroit. Une voie alternative est recherchée à travers la reconstruction de la compréhension 
kantienne de l’autonomie morale. De cette manière, un cadre est proposé pour un jugement mo-
ral à partir duquel il est possible de déduire et de justifier de manière adéquate la compréhen-
sion contemporaine d’autonomie en tant que droit, en tant que faculté réflexive de l’individu, en 
tant que responsabilité et intégrité. Les conclusions normatives dérivent de l’élargissement de 













The paper aims to analyse conceptually the meaning of the term ‘autonomy’ and to ex-
amine critically its relations with other ethical norms. The question posed is whether au-
tonomy is a right, or an ability, or a capacity, or an achievement, and whether it ought to 
be distinguished from self-determination. It is shown that autonomy is an anthropologi-
cal principle, and that self-determination as its manifestation is a human right. As to its 
relation with other ethical norms, it is shown that there are possible conflicts between a 
patient’s and his doctor’s autonomies, as well as between autonomy and the duty to protect 
life, and between autonomy and care, so that trust plays an important role. The author 
concludes that man is autonomous not if and only if he is able to determine himself, but 
rather that he has the right to determine himself because he is autonomous. This holds for 
everybody from their beginning to their end, irrespective of what they are able to do and 
the situation they may be in. Since every human being is autonomous, autonomy entails 
self-limitation, and so it does not mean independence, but interdependence. As to trust, au-
tonomy is to be acknowledged, while trust is to be practised, since autonomy is of people, 





– two main problems: (i) it is understood in various ways, and (ii) it stands in 








For  further  details  see:  Jan  P.  Beckmann, 








The notion of ‘autonomy’ and the variety of its interpretations
1. Autonomy – unrestricted self-determination of the individual?







a state of independence and ‘A’ manifested by an act of self-determination. 
That man2 is independent in the sense of selfhood is one thing, and that he can 
determine himself is another. There are situations in which a person knows 
himself  to be  independent of others, but feels unable  to determine himself, 




That  independence  and  self-determination  are  not  one  and  the  same  thing 














against paternalism by opposing  it. Thus,  the  relationship between  ‘A’ and 
paternalism is  that of cause and effect. Accordingly,  they necessarily differ 
from each other.
























4. Autonomy – a human right?













5. The distinction between autonomy and self-determination – 




beginning to their end, regardless of what their abilities and circumstances 
are. The advantage of  this understanding lies  in  the fact  that  ‘A’ applies  to 
everybody and  that  it does not allow for any grading of ‘A’ (i.e., “more or 
less ‘A’”) and, at  the same time, allows the safeguarding of one remaining 
autonomous if one is unable to manifest ‘A’. It also allows for calling ‘A’ not 












Jan  P.  Beckmann,  “Patientenverfügungen: 
Autonomie  und  Selbstbestimmung  vor  dem 




hoff et al. (eds.), Medizinische Ethik im Wan-
del. Grundlagen – Konkretionen – Perspek-













not if and only if he is able to determine himself; it is rather the case that, be-
cause man is autonomous, he has the right to determine himself. Actually, ‘A’ 
belongs to those principles which apply to humans for their very own sake and 
not for their being young or old, healthy or sick, able or not.
6. Autonomy is an anthropological principle and not a right, 
   while self-determination is a right




in that it concerns humans in all their different statuses – be they young or old, 
alert or demented, healthy or ill. ‘A’ is completely independent of any human 
faculty or accidental situation that a human being may find himself in.
Two important consequences follow from this:
(i)     As  an anthropological principle,  the  notion of  ‘A’ does not  allow  for 















being. This is, so to speak, ‘A’ within the limits of the autonomy of fellow 
humans’. Thus, man is autonomous by himself, but not for himself. If he 
denounced the ‘A’ of others, he would denounce his own ‘A’.
6.2. Self-determination as manifestation of autonomy
With the notion of ‘determination’ we have arrived at a particularly important 















7. Autonomy – a social characteristic relating all humans to each other
Because ‘A’, as has been argued so far, represents a necessary human propri-
um that applies to everybody irrespective of what they are able to do and the 







represents a  state which unites all human beings. The notion of  ‘A’ would 
entail an inner contradiction if one were to leave out its social dimension. The 
individual is autonomous in the sense of self-governance if and only if fellow 
humans are in the very same position, because the individual can set up “his” 
laws only under the condition that the same laws are valid for everyone else. 
Otherwise, it would not be ‘A’, but tyranny.
8. Excursus: Autonomy according to Kant
‘A’ necessarily implies, as has already been mentioned,5 self-limitation. This is 
closely connected with Kant’s categorical imperative.6 The basis for this is the 





subjecthood and of his being an “end in itself, not merely a means”.8 For, like 
4
Cf. Kant’s notion of “Fähigkeit, allgemein ge-
setzgebend,  obgleich mit  dem Beding,  eben 
dieser  Gesetzgebung  zugleich  selbst  unter-
worfen  zu  sein”.  Immanuel  Kant, Grundle-
gung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (= GMS), BA 
17,  in:  Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schrif-
ten, ed. by Königlich-Preussische Akademie 






in  deiner  Person  als  in  der  Person  eines  je-
den  anderen,  jederzeit  zugleich  als  Zweck, 
niemals  bloß  als Mittel  brauchest.”  I.  Kant, 
GMS, BA 67. According to Kant, the catego-
rical  imperative  is  the  “principle  of  autono-
my”; cf. ibid., BA 83.
7
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separated: self-legislation and,  through the  latter, self-restriction. Both pro-
vide the basis for human dignity. Kant writes:
“A rational being […] belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member if it is universally legislating 




















Autonomy in different contexts




the need  for help and  lack of  (sufficient) medical knowledge. At  the  same 
















2. Autonomy versus protection of life?
Grave ethical difficulties are involved in situations when a patient whom the 
doctor  could help  refuses his help. This does not pose  ethical  problems  in 
normal circumstances. An adult patient always has the right to refuse therapy 
and,  to  that  extent,  the doctor depends upon his patient’s wishes. But how 










it is the life of the patient and not of anybody else, how can anyone force him 







































lung  von  Vorausverfügungen  aus  ethischer 

























poses ‘A’. To  take  care  of  a  person presupposes  the person’s  consent 
– even if the person is, at a given moment, unable to manifest his will. 
A patient may appear to be reduced in – or even deprived of – autarchy 



































They cannot be interlinked  if  their  formal difference has been overlooked. 
This could be the case if one of the two notions were to be understood to be 
possibly compensating for a lack of the other one. A principle cannot, by its 
very nature, compensate for an attitude.
However, the two notions can in bioethical analyses be linked with each other 









– which is the manifestation of their autonomy by an act of self-determina-
tion – patients need to trust doctors in view of the insecurity and risks of any 
kind of medical treatment and therapeutic options made available by the rapid 
developments of modern medicine. Thus, ‘A’ is to be acknowledged, and trust 
is to be practiced.
In bioethical analysis  this means  that trust presupposes respect for ‘A’ and 
not vice versa. In order to trust people, one has to be aware of both one’s own 
and of other peoples’ ‘A’ and of their right to self-determination. In a word, 
‘A’ is of people, while trust  is in people. The connection between trust and 































human proprium, autonomy belongs to everybody from their beginning to 






















O značenju i nekim kontekstima termina ‘autonomija’
Konceptualno istraživanje
Sažetak
Članak nastoji konceptualno analizirati značenje termina ‘autonomija’ i kritički ispitati njegove 
odnose s drugim etičkim normama. Postavlja se pitanje je li autonomija pravo ili sposobnost 
ili mogućnost te da li bi ju trebalo razlikovati od samoodređenja. Pokazuje se da je autonomija 
antropološki princip te da je samoodređenje kao njezina manifestacija ljudsko pravo. Što se tiče 
njezina odnosa s drugim etičkim normama, pokazuje se da su mogući sukobi između autonomije 
pacijenta i autonomije liječnika, kao i između autonomije i dužnosti zaštite života te između 
autonomije i skrbi, tako da važnu ulogu igra povjerenje. Autor zaključuje da čovjek nije autono-
man ako i samo ako je sposoban za samoodređenje nego da ima pravo na samoodređenje zato 
što je autonoman. To važi za svakoga od njegova početka do njegova kraja, bez obzira na to što 
je sposoban učiniti i situaciju u kojoj se može naći. Budući da je svako ljudsko biće autonomno, 
autonomija za sobom povlači samoograničavanje, tako da ne znači nezavisnost, nego međuza-
visnost. Što se tiče povjerenja, autonomiju treba priznavati, a povjerenje treba prakticirati zato 








Zur Bedeutung und einigen Kontexten des Terminus ‚Autonomie‘
Eine Begriffsuntersuchung
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag gilt einer Analyse der Bedeutung des Terminus ‚Autonomie’ sowie einer kritischen 
Prüfung seiner Beziehungen zu anderen ethischen Normen. Zu klären ist, ob Autonomie ein 
Recht, eine Fähigkeit, ein Vermögen oder eine Errungenschaft darstellt und ob man zwischen 
Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung unterscheiden muss. Es wird gezeigt, dass Autonomie ein an-
thropologisches Prinzip ist und Selbstbestimmung als Manifestation von Autonomie ein mensch-
liches Recht. Was die Beziehungen zu anderen ethischen Normen angeht, so zeigen sich mögliche 
ethische Konflikte zwischen Patienten- und Arztautonomie, zwischen Autonomie und der Pflicht 
zum Lebensschutz und zwischen Autonomie und Fürsorge, was der Norm des Vertrauens eine 
wichtige Rolle zuweist. Der Autor gelangt zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Mensch nicht deswegen 
noch dann autonom ist, wenn er sich selbst zu bestimmen in der Lage ist, sondern dass er das 
Recht zur Selbstbestimmung besitzt, weil er autonom ist. Dies gilt für jedermann, unabhängig 
von seinem Können oder seiner Lebenssituation, vom Anfang bis zum Ende seines Lebens. Da 
jedes menschliche Wesen in diesem Sinne autonom ist, impliziert Autonomie Selbstbegrenzung 
und somit nicht Unabhängigkeit, sondern Interdependenz. Was die Norm des Vertrauens angeht, 
so muss Autonomie anerkannt, Vertrauen hingegen praktiziert werden. Denn: Autonomie gehört 




De la signification et de certains contextes du terme « autonomie »
Recherche conceptuelle
Résumé
Cet article tente d’analyser de manière conceptuelle la signification du terme d’autonomie et de 
questionner ses rapports avec d’autres normes éthiques. La question est de savoir si l’autono-
mie est un droit, une faculté ou une possibilité, et s’il faut la différencier de l’autodétermination. 
Il est montré que l’autonomie est un principe anthropologique et que l’autodétermination, qui 
en est sa manifestation, est un droit humain. En ce qui concerne ses rapports avec d’autres 
normes éthiques, il est montré que d’autres conflits sont possibles, des conflits entre l’autono-
mie du patient et l’autonomie du médecin, entre l’autonomie et les devoirs de protection de la 
vie, mais aussi entre l’autonomie et les soins. Ainsi, un rôle important revient à la confiance. 
L’auteur conclut que l’homme n’est pas autonome, si et seulement si, il est capable d’autodéter-
mination, mais c’est bien parce qu’il a un droit à l’autodétermination qu’il est autonome. Cela 
vaut pour chacun depuis ses débuts jusqu’à ses fins, indépendamment de ce dont il est capable 
de faire et de la situation dans laquelle il peut se trouver. Étant donné que chaque être humain 
est autonome, l’autonomie entraîne à ses côtés l’autolimitation, de telle manière qu’il ne s’agit 
pas d’indépendance mais d’interdépendance. En ce qui concerne la confiance, l’autonomie doit 
être reconnue, et la confiance doit être pratiquée, car ce dont il s’agit c’est d’autonomie des 
personnes, et c’est bien en la personne que l’on a confiance.
Mots-clés









Protected, but also Jeopardised by Criminal Law?
Abstract
The paper explores the notion of human dignity in law in general and in criminal law in 
particular, it examines whether human dignity is a legal interest protected by criminal law 
(e.g., in cases of criminalisation of reproductive cloning and acts of racism), and it reflects 
upon how criminal law may jeopardise the human dignity of perpetrators, particularly in 








































morally  rejected.2 Thus,  the  artificial  termination  of  pregnancy  at  an  early 
stage (up to 3 months into pregnancy) with the consent of the expecting wo-
man and  in a medically safe environment  is  legally valid under Greek  law 
(Art. 304 § 4 GPC3). For some social groups, however, it is far from being 
morally indifferent or morally acceptable, while some others would morally 
reject it at a glance. In order for law to facilitate its enforcement, it is only 
natural that it tries to align it with morality as much as possible.
This brings us to the last fundamental clarification of criminal law in particu-
lar. Criminal  law  is  admittedly  the harshest mechanism that states employ 






law is closely linked to the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of 
law.
II. The notion of human dignity in law in general and 


































III. Protecting human dignity 
      as a legal interest by criminal law
According to Article 2 § 1 of the Greek Constitution, the state’s primary obli-
gation is to respect and protect the value of the human being. Therefore, and 





















See  Ioannis  Manoledakis,  Ποινικό Δίκαιο. 
Επιτομή Γενικού Μέρους [Criminal Law. 




πεια’:	 Έννομο	 αγαθό	 ή	 απόλυτο	 όριο	 στην	
άσκηση	 εξουσίας;”	 [“‘Human	Dignity’:	 Le-
gal Interest or Absolute Limit on the Exercise 
of Power?”], in: I. Manoledakis, C. Prittwitz 
(eds.), Η ποινική προστασία της ανθρώπινης 
αξιοπρέπειας [The Penal Protection of Hu-
man Dignity], Thessaloniki 1997, p. 13.
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βασική έννοια του Ποινικού Δικαίου  [Legal 




τικό δίκαιο, Ατομικά δικαιώματα [Consti-
tutional Law, Civil Rights],  Vol.  b,  Athens 
1991,  p.  1138;  see  also Antonis  Manitakis, 
Κράτος δικαίου και δικαστικός έλεγχος της 
συνταγματικότητας [Rule of Law and Judicial 
Review of Legislation],  Vol.  I,  Thessaloniki 
1994, p. 408.
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see  Konstantinos  Konstantinidis,  Ποινικό 
δίκαιο και ανθρώπινη αξιοπρέπεια [Criminal 
Law and Human Dignity], Athens 1987, pp. 
107ff;  Dimitris  Spirakos, Folter als Prob-




της	 λαθρομετανάστευσης”	 [“The	 Criminal	
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Chlepas,  D.  Spirakos,  Ο ν 1975/1991 περί 
αλλοδαπών και το Σύνταγμα [Law 1975/1991 















































































Unequivocally,  the extent  to which  fertilised ova consist of human genetic 
material and incorporate the value of their genitors’ personality is the extent 
to which they should be treated differently from the rest of things. To name 
but one example, they cannot be sold. However, fertilised ova cannot be re-




human genetic material as an object15 which has the unique attribute to lead 
11
On  the  innovations  and  general  character-
istics  of  the  legal  framework,  see  Efi  Kou-
nougeri-Manoledaki,  Τεχνητή γονιμοποίηση 
και Οικογενειακό Δίκαιο. Η ειδική ελληνική 
νομοθεσία: Νόμοι 3089/2002 και 3305/2005 
[In Vitro Fertilization and Family Law. Spe-
cial Greek Legislation: Laws 3089/2002 and 
3305/2005],  2nd  edition,  Athens  2005,  pp. 
1–6.
12
On  the  dangers  of  reproductive  cloning, 
see	 Donald	 M.	 Bruce,	 “Βλαστικά	 κύτταρα,	





Biology,  Το μέλλον των Βιοεπιστημών  [The 
Future of Biological Science],  Heraklion 
2006,  pp.  169–170;  Françoise  Shenfield, 
“Cloning:  Reproductive  (Crime?),  Thera-
peutic  (Panacea?), Where  to Now?”,  in: M. 
Kaiafa-Gbandi,  E.  Kounougeri-Manoledaki, 
E. Symeonidou-Kastanidou (eds.), Biotechno-




ποίηση	 ως	 επιστημονικό	 κατόρθωμα	 και	
ιστορική	πρόκληση”	[“Cloning	as	a	Scientific	
Achievement and Historical Challenge”], in: 





ποινικό	 δίκαιο”	 [“Genetic	 Technology	 and	





ρμα,	 ωάριο	 και	 γονιμοποιημένο	 ωάριο	 που	
βρίσκονται	έξω	από	το	ανθρώπινο	σώμα	–	Η	
νομική	 τους	 φύση	 και	 μεταχείριση	 κατά	 το	
αστικό	 δίκαιο”	 [“Sperm,	 Ovum	 and	 Ferti-
lized Ovum Outside the Human Body – Their 
Legal  Entity  and  Treatment  According  to 
Civil  Law”], Armenopoulos,  1999,  pp.  469, 
474ff; Takis K. Vidalis, Ζωή χωρίς πρόσωπο. 
Το σύνταγμα και η χρήση του ανθρώπινου 
γενετικού υλικού [Life with no Face. The Con-










to human reproduction after its unification with relevant components or under 
specific conditions, and at the preservation of the above attribute in a way 




















































IV. Human dignity jeopardised by criminal law?
In what  follows,  it  is useful  to extend our  focus  to another very  important 
aspect which  can  provide  a  holistic  view on  the  real  extent  of  the  protec-
tion of human dignity by the means of criminal law. This cannot be achieved 
by merely documenting  the  respective extent of criminalisation of  relevant 














ation) against  the human dignity of offenders  that  reasonably receive more 
focused attention.
As has already been mentioned,  for  law in general and for criminal  law in 







legislator directly bends the relevant protective milieu via regulatory provi-
sions or, at any rate, tolerates the possibility of inflicting the value of a human 




Fertilisation:  Moral  and  Legal  Problems”], 
Poinika Chronika, 1988, p. 943, but also the 
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[“The  Constitutional  Dimension  of  Wrong-
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Σωματικές βλάβες  [Personal Injuries],  2nd 
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for  the value of  the human being,35 criminals  included?36 When police ex-

































































termeasure  against  organised  (and,  therefore,  complex  and  intricate)  crime 
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zaštićeno, ali i ugroženo kaznenim pravom?
Sažetak
Rad istražuje pojam ljudskoga dostojanstva u pravu općenito i kaznenom pravu napose, odnos-
no ispituje je li ljudsko dostojanstvi pravni interes zaštićen kaznenim pravom (npr. u slučajevi-
ma kriminalizacije reproduktivnog kloniranja i rasističkih činova) te reflektira o tome kako kaz-
neno pravo može ugroziti ljudsko dostojanstvo počinitelja, osobito u slučajevima kažnjavanja 






geschützt, aber auch gefährdet durch Strafrecht?
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit erforscht den Begriff der Menschenwürde im Recht generell und vornehmlich im 
Strafrecht bzw. untersucht, ob die Menschenwürde ein durch das Strafrecht geschütztes recht-
liches Interesse repräsentiert (beispielsweise in den Fällen der Kriminalisierung von repro-
duktivem Klonen und rassistischen Akten). Des Weiteren reflektiert die Arbeit darüber, wie das 
Strafrecht die Menschenwürde des Täters in Gefahr bringen kann, insbesondere in den Fällen 





La dignité humaine: 
protégée, mais aussi menacée par le droit pénal?
Résumé
Ce travail examine le concept de dignité humaine dans le droit en général et dans le droit pénal 
en particulier, c’est-à-dire qu’il pose la question de savoir si la dignité humaine est un intérêt 
de droit protégée par le droit pénal (p. ex. dans les situations de criminalisation du clonage re-
productif et dans les actes racistes) et réfléchit sur la manière dont le droit pénal peut menacer 
la dignité humaine du délinquant, particulièrement dans des situations où les peines sont liées 










On Some Doctrinal Disputations 
in Early Buddhist Interpretations of 
pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Co-arising)
Abstract
Pratītyasamutpāda (Dependent Co-arising) is a foundational Buddhist teaching canonically 
announced by Buddha as that which represents his “middle position” between the two (on-
tological) extremes of existence and nonexistence. Nevertheless, early Buddhist philoso-
phers barely reached a consensus about its precise doctrinal or even grammatical meaning. 
In this article, I provide a basic outline of these disputations based on primary sources 
trying to show that they, in fact, reflect their various understandings of the problem of cau-








Cf.  a  grammatical  analysis  of  the  term  by 
Candrakīrti:	 “The	 verbal	 root	 I means  ‘mo-












ment’ or  ‘with regard  to’  [‘dependence on’]. 
The  verbal  root PAD,  preceded  by  [the  pre-
verb] samut [means] ‘appearance’ and so the 




ditions.” etirgatyarthaḥ, pratiḥ prāptyarthaḥ 
| upasargavaśena dhātvarthavipariṇāmāt 
– upasargeṇa dhātvartho balādanyatra nī-
yate | gaṅgāsalilamādhuryaṁ sāgareṇa 
yathāmbhasā || pratītyaśabdo’tra lyabantaḥ 
prāptāvapekṣāyāṁ vartate |  samutpūrvaḥ 
padiḥ prādurbhāvārtha iti samutpādaśabdaḥ 
































































“What  is  paṭiccasamuppāda?  Conditioned  by  birth,  Bhikkhus,  decay  and  death  [occurs]. 
Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this property [or: base, dhātu] stands, namely [or: as] the stead-
fastness of phenomena (dhammaṭṭhitatā), the orderliness of phenomena (dhammaniyāmatā) or 
that-conditionality  (idappaccayatā). The Tathāgata  becomes  fully  awake  to  this  and  realises 







losophers  concerned  the  word  formation  of 
“pratītya”.	 Some	 of	 them	 (e.g.,	 Candrakīrti,	
the	 Vaibhāṣika  school,  Buddhaghosa)  held 
that  it  is  a  gerund  (“having  been  met/at-
tained”),	while	others	(mostly	the	Sautrāntika	
school,	 but	 also	 some	 Mādhyamikas)	 held	
that  it  is  a  secondary  derivative  noun  in  a 
sense of “those which are transient”. This al-
ternative  grammatical  analysis was  reported 
by Vasubandhu:  “Others,  however,  interpret 
[the  meaning  of  PS]  differently  in  order  to 
remove  this  criticism  [apparently  by  Gram-




noun],  i.e.,  ‘those which are  transient’. Pad, 
preceded by ut, means ‘appearance’. [There-
fore,  according  to  them], pratītyasamutpāda 
[means]  the co-arising  [‘arising  in combina-
tion’]  of  transient  [things]  under  this-and-
that  totality  of  causes.”  anye punarasya 
codyasya parihārārthamanyathā parikalpa-
yanti – pratirvīpsārthaḥ, itau sādhava 
ityāḥ = anavasthāyinaḥ, utpūrvaḥ padiḥ 
prādurbhāvārthaḥ, tāṃ tāṃ kāraṇasāmagrīṃ 
prati ityānāṃ samavāyenotpādaḥ pratītya-
samutpāda iti, Bhāṣya to AK 3. 28ab.
3
Inquiring  –  almost  rhetorically  –  why  Bud-
dha taught PS the way he did, Buddhaghosa 
explains  that  it  was  done  in  that  way  “be-
cause  of  the  complete  auspiciousness  (be-
neficence)  of  PS  [thought  in  that  way]  and 
because  he  himself  [Buddha]  has  obtained 
grace (elegance) in instructing PS [that way]. 
For  PS  is  entirely  auspicious  (beneficial).” 
Paṭiccasamuppādassa samantabhaddakattā 
sayañ ca desanāvilāsappattatā. Samantab-
haddako hi paṭiccasamuppādo  (Vsm. XVII, 
33).
4
Some  interpreters  of  Buddha’s  treatment  of 
language  saw  in him a precursor of  linguis-
tic  nominalism,  according  to  which  there 
is  no  inherent  or  “inborn”  relationship  be-
tween  words  and  things  “out  there”  with 
which  the  former  are  inevitable  associated. 
Language does not  reveal  any permanent or 
substantial “primary meanings”, but is being 
“freely”  constituted  in  public  usage  through 
generations just as any other human activity. 
Meanings  of  words  are,  so  to  speak,  arbi-
trary, dependent on the “speaker’s intention” 
(vivakṣā),  and  thereby  only  conventional. 
This line of thought was, of course, developed 
in  later  Indian  Grammarians’  (and  in  some 
Buddhists’)  speculations  and  some  of  Bud-




is  liberated  (vimuttacitta)  expresses  himself 
in  the way  it was  said  in  the world without 
being  attached  [to  these  expressions]”  (yañ 
ca loke vuttam tena voharati aparāmasan 
ti). Likewise,  at  the  end  of Poṭṭhapādasutta 
(D.  9)  Buddha  says:  “These  [such  as,  atta-
paṭilābha, etc.] are the world’s designations, 
the  world’s  expressions,  the  world’s  ways 
of  speaking,  the  world’s  descriptions,  with 
which the Tathāgata [i.e., Buddha] expresses 
himself, but without being attached [to these 
expression]”  (Imā kho, citta, lokasamañ-
ñā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññatti-
yo, yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti). 
However,  taking  the  context  of  these  state-
ments  into  account,  they  are  hardly  proof 
that Buddha advanced full-fledged linguistic 






it.  This  still  does  not  necessarily mean  that 
Dharma expressed in his “technical termino-
logy” (PS, pañcaskandha, etc.) is also “con-
ventional”	 as	 was	 firmly	 held	 in	Mahāyāna	
Buddhism  (cf.,  for  example,  Vasubandhu’s 
Bhāṣya  to  Madhyānta-vibhanga  III.  22b, 
where all of Buddha’s so-called utterances or 





Buddha’s words  and utterances  are  revealed 
only  to  the  enlightened ones. The meanings 
of Buddha’s words are, so to speak, revealed 
gradually (and not at once) as one progresses 
on  the  Path.  But,  whatever  language  is  or 
whatever it refers to, all of its constituents be-














As  for  the abstract “qualifications” of PS enumerated  in  the above Sutta, 
Pāli	Commentaries	give	explanations	which	are	entirely	dependent	on	the	
later  abhidhammic  type  or  method  of  analysis.  Dhātu,  dhammaṭṭhitatā, 
dhammaniyāmatā  and  idappaccayatā  all  refer  to  the  inherent  nature  of 
conditions  (paccaya-sabhāva) which,  once present,  cannot  but  bring  into 
existence another (definite) dhamma(s), i.e., jāti (birth), once present, can-
not  but  “instigate”  jarā-maraṇa  (ageing  and  death)  to  occur,  etc.9  So,  at 
least	 according	 to	 the	 Theravāda	 Buddhist	 school	 (Buddhaghosa),	 these	
qualifications do not refer to something which is above dhamma-processes 
(the  distinction  between  the Law/Principle  and  its  “applications”  or  phe-
nomenal  occurrences),  but  point  to  the  very  nature  (dhammatā)  of  these 
processes  themselves  to which Buddha “became  fully  awake”. That  is  to 
say, the nature of dhamma-processes is these processes themselves as they 
occur and this “fact” is termed by Buddha as “paṭiccasamupāda”, that is, 
dhammaṭṭhitatā,  etc.  Sabhāva  (one’s  own  nature)  in  this  connection,  as 













































The  terms  sammuti-sacca  (‘conventional 







for  ‘the  highest  goal’.  Commonly  accepted 
linguistic  usage  (lokiya-vohāra,  based  on 
“general opinion”, sammuti; cf. Sasaki, 1992: 
79) is, for example, ‘being’ (satta) or ‘chariot’ 
(ratha),  to  take  famous  examples  from  S. 
I.  135,  although  no  such  things  exist  when 
closely  analysed  (Yathā hi aṅgasambhārā 
hoti saddo ratho iti; evaṃ khandhesu santesu, 






atthatas  or  paramaṭṭhena  (from  the  highest 
point or meaning) was added only in the later 
section  of  the  Canon  (Abhidhammapiṭaka 
and thereafter), announcing an analysis (and 
linguistic  expressions) of  reality  in  terms of 
compounded  and  uncompounded  dharmas. 
How  these  two  types of  linguistic usages or 
discourses  (cf.  also  the  neyyattha-nītattha 
distinction in A. I. 60) were “reified” as two 
distinct  types  of  truth  (sacca)  “without  a 
third” (cf. AA I. 95) or even “realities” (sat) 
in  Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika  (cf. AK  6.4.)  is 
not clear. Anyway, Mahāyāna and particular-
ly Madhyamaka seem to reinforce  the origi-
nal  meaning  of  paramattha  (paramārtha) 
as  ‘the  highest  goal’  which  has  nothing  in 
common with any kind of discourse, truth or 
analysed  reality,  including paramārthatas  in 
the abhidharma  sense, which  –  accordingly 
and inevitably – altogether belong to saṃvṛti 
(concealing/deceptive  reality),  including,  of 
course, Madhyamaka’s  discourse  itself.  The 
latter only indirectly (and hopefully) points to 
or  “makes  known”  (jñāpayati)  the Ultimate 
(cf. VV 64 and Commentary) through a par-






























ways – as  a  statement  referring  to universal 
truth  penetrated  by  Buddha,  as  an  explana-
tory  basis  or  frame  for  situating  his  teach-
ings, and as a practical argument for the pos-
sibility  and  efficiency of mental  cultivation. 
Linguistically,  PS  reveals  itself  as  a  proper 










put.”  (Ko nu kho, bhante, upādiyatīti? No 
kallo pañho ti bhagavā avoca – upādiyatī’ti 
ahaṃ na vadāmi. Upādiyatī’ti cāhaṃ va-
deyyaṃ, tatrassa kallo pañho –  ko nu kho, 
bhante, upādiyatīti? Evañcāhaṃ na vadāmi. 













is  only  a  temporal  difference  –  and  this  is  not  a  category  of  the paramat-
tha  type.19	The	Vaibhāṣika  school,  on  the other hand, burdens heavily  this 




In  the  Nidānasaṃyukta  (of  the  Saṃyuktāgama)  of  the  northern  Buddhist 
Canon,  there  is one Sūtra	without	a	counterpart	 in	 the	Pāli	Canon,	entitled	





Thus,  the eye, not being, becomes and, being,  it  ceases  [lit.,  ‘goes back’].21 There  is action, 
there  is  result, but except  for  the dharmasaṃketa, one does not maintain a doer who  throws 
away these skandhas and takes up again other skandhas. … Here this dharmasaṃketa [means] 

































a mere  “symbol”  (saṃketa)  of  reality  suited  for  human  understanding,30  a 
reality which is otherwise probably indescribable?
– kiṃpaccayā nu kho, bhante, upādānan’ti, 
esa kallo pañho  (Moḷiyaphaggunasutta,  S. 
2.1.2.2). Cf.  also M.  II.  9:  “Dhamma  is  ex-
plained/preached  in  a  causal  (connected) 
way,  not  in  a  non-causal  (non-connected) 





pendent co-arising,  that  is emptiness;  that  is 
based on conventional designation; only that 
is the middle path” (yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ 
śūnyatāṃ taṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir 
upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā).
8
Katamo ca, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo? 
Jātipaccayā, bhikkhave, jarāmaraṇaṃ. Uppādā 
vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ, 
ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaniyāmatā idap-
paccayatā. Taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati 
abhisameti. Abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā 
ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivara-
ti vibhajati  uttānīkaroti. ‘Passathā’ti cāha–
’jātipaccayā, bhikkhave, jarāmaraṇaṃ’. … 
Iti kho, bhikkhave, yā tatra tathatā avitathatā 
anaññathatā idappaccayatā– ayaṃ vuccati, 
bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppādo.
9
Ṭhitā vā sā dhātū ti, ṭhito va so paccaya-
sabhāvo, na kadāci jāti-jarā-maraṇassa 
paccayo na hoti … Paccayena hi paccay’ 
uppannā dhammā tiṭṭhanti: tasmā paccayo 
dhammā-ṭṭhitatā ti vuccati. Paccayo dhamme 
niyameti, tasmā dhamma-niyāmatā ti vuccati. 
Idappaccayatā ti, imesaṁ jarā-maraṇādīnaṁ 
paccayā idappaccayā, idappaccayā ca 
[Visuddhimagga:  eva]  idappaccayatā  (SA, 
Vol.  II,  40).  Idappacayatā  (lit.,  ‘that-condi-
tionality’)  is  thus  the  same  as  idappaccayā 
(‘that-conditions’) or, alternatively, as an ‘as-
semblage  of  conditions’  (paccayasamūha) 
–  “Because  there  is  a  condition  or  because 
there is an assemblage of conditions for those 
(occurrences) beginning with  jarāmaraṇa as 
already  stated,  it  is  called  idappaccayatā” 
(yathāvuttānaṁ etesaṁ jarāmaraṇādīnaṁ 
paccayato vā paccayasamūhato vā idap-
paccayatā ti vutto,  ibid.,  41;  cf.  also  Vsm, 
XVII,  6).  Tathāta, avitathatā, anaññathatā 
and idappaccayatā are epithets or synonyms 
for  “the  property  (or:  sign)  of  conditions” 
(paccayākāra)  –  “Because  each  particular 
dhamma  originates  through  [its]  particular 
[appropriate]  conditions,  neither  more  nor 
less, it is [called] suchness (tathatā). Because 
[once] conditions reach [their] completeness, 




tions  [appropriate]  to  some  other  dhamma, 
it  is  [called]  not-otherness  (anaññathatā) 
[for  the  interpretation  of  idappaccayatā  in 
this  context,  see  above,  paccayasamūha  as 
an ‘assemblage of conditions’]” – Tathatā ti 
ādīni paccayākārass’ eva vevacanāni: So tehi 
tehi paccayehi anūnādhikeh’ eva tassa tassa 
dhammassa sambhavato tathatā ti, sāmaggim-
upagatesu paccayesu muhuttam pi tato 
nibbattanadhammānaṁ asambhavābhāvato 
avitathatā ti, aññadhammapaccayehi aññad-





Dhammato añño kattā natthī ti dassetuṁ 
(Dīghanikāya-Ṭīkā, 673). The same text also 
mentions  another,  very  curious  reason  why 
sabhāva  is  introduced  in  the  “definition”  of 
dhamma – “because of the acceptance of the 
opinion of people who need to be instructed” 
(bodheyyajanānurodhavasena,  ibid.,  76),  cf. 
Karunadasa (1996: 15).
11
Katame ca, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamuppannā 
dhammā? Jarāmaraṇaṃ, bhikkhave, anic-
caṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ kha-
yadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgadhammaṃ 
nirodhadhammaṃ.
12
Paṭiccasamuppādo ti paccayadhammā vedit-
abbā; paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā ti tehi tehi 
paccayehi nibbattadhammā,  Vsm,  XVII,  4; 
cf. also SA, ibid., 41, paṭicca-samuppannaṁ 
ti, paccaye nissāya uppannaṁ.
13
In  the  final  analysis,  there  is  no  difference 
between  PS  and  pratītyasamutpanna  be-
cause,  according  to  Śāstras  (presumably 





utpādyate ‘smāditi kṛtvā | phalabhūta-


















has  a beginning  (the  time aspect of  causality, dharmasaṃketa),  but  is  also 
beginningless (the actuality aspect of causality, paramārtha). Saṃghabhadra 




























A  thing or  phenomenon  is  PS, which  further means  that  “it”  is  nothing  in 
itself  or  by  itself  (niḥsvabhāva),  and  is  hence  a  bare  or  “empty”  (śūnya) 
phenomenon, whose  “positive”  existence  is  nothing  but  a mentally  gener-
ated “dependent designation” (upādāya prajñaptir). What can be said of phe-
nomena  “as  they  are”  (yathābhūta)  is  only  the mere  fact  of  conditionality 
(idaṃpratyayatāmātra), and there is no other way of establishing them.36 The 








For  Madhyamaka,  thus,  PS  is  a  mighty  “cure”  for  the  conceptualisa-
tion of  reality,  and our  inborn and obsessive  inclinations  towards  “things” 
phalabhāvāt | na caivaṃ satyavyavasthānaṃ 
bhavati, bhinnāpekṣatvāt | yadapekṣya pra-
tītyasamutpādo na tadevāpekṣya pratītya-
samutpannam, hetuphalavat pitṛputravacca, 




etadapyutsūtram; sūtre ‘nyathā nirdeśāt | 
“pratītyasamutpādaḥ katamaḥ? Yadutāsmin 
satīdaṃ bhavati” iti vistareṇoktvā iti yā “tra 
dharmatā dharmasthititā yāvadaviparyasta-
tā ayamucyate pratītyasamutpādaḥ” iti | 
dharmajātiḥ dharmāṇāṃ śailiḥ | ato yeyaṃ 
dharmatā ya eṣa niyamaḥ | avidyāyāmeva 









aviparītatā  (exactness),  together  with  the 
abovementioned aviparyastatā.
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Cf.  also Cruise  (1983:  155):  “‘Causation’  is 
not one thing and ‘things involved in causa-
tion’ another … to be a thing is to be a causal 
thing,  to  be  conditioned  and  a  condition.” 
Kalupahana  (1975:  68),  on  the  other  hand, 
makes a “… distinction between a causal re-
lation (paṭicca-samuppāda) and  the causally 





Cf.  the  commentarial  explanation  of  Bud-
dha’s  famous  statement  “who  sees  dham-
ma  sees  paṭiccasamuppāda,  who  sees 
paṭiccasamuppāda  sees  dhamma”  –  “Who 
sees paṭiccasamuppāda sees conditions, who 
sees  dhamma  sees  dependently  co-arisen 
dhammas”  (yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati 




This  fact  is  also  reflected  in  well-known 
complementary  commentarial  “definitions” 
of  dhamma,  which  suggest  that  dhamma, 
sabhāva and paccaya are in the final instance 
one  and  the  same  “thing”:  “Dhammas  are 
so called as they bear their own nature”, At-
tano sabhāvaṁ dhārenti ti dhammā,  DhsA, 
126,  and  “Dhammas  are  so  called  as  they 
are  borne  by  their  conditions”,  Paccayehi 
dhāriyanti ti dhammā, DhsA, 63. In the same 
line of reasoning is Buddhaghosa’s criticism 
of  those  who  imagine  that  “idappaccayatā 
is  the essence (bhāva) of  that-conditions”  in 





[occurring]  in  formations when  there  is  that 
[particular  mode  in  ignorance  acting  as  a 
cause]”. Rejecting completely such an  inter-
pretation,  Buddhaghosa  underlines  that  “it 
is  ignorance,  etc.,  themselves  that  are  called 
‘cause’”. – Ye pi maññanti, idappaccayānaṁ 
bhāvo idappaccayatā – bhāvo ca nāma 
yo ākāro avijjādīnaṁ  saṅkhārādi-pātub-
hāve hetu so – tasmiṁ saṅkhāravikāre pa-




Abhidhamma,  a  mere  “concept”  (paññatti), 





not  existing paramatthatas,  become  support 
for  generating  consciousness  in  the  form 
of  shadow(s)  of  things  (ultimate)”  –  evam 
ādippabhedā pana paramatthato avijjamānā 
pi atthacchāyākārena cittuppādānam ālam-
banabhūtā, Abhidhammattha sangaha, VIII, 
29, 30. It could be said that time is understood 




The  entirety  of  this  Sūtra  (Saṃyuktāgama, 
335)  was  reconstructed  from  Chinese  by 
Lamotte  (1973), although  the part cited was 
already  reconstructed  by  Poussin  (cf.  n.  80 
in  chapter  nine  of  his  French  translation  of 
AKB).  This  part  of  the  Sūtra  was  cited  by 
Vasubandhu in his commentary to AK 3.18.
21





footing  in Buddha’s  own words;  cf. Bhāṣya 
to AK 5.27b.
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Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtraṃ katamam/ cakṣur 
bhikṣava utpadyamānam na kutaścid āgac-
chati/ nirudhyamānam na kvacit saṁnicayam 





which  constantly  fuel  a  distorted  vision  of  reality  and  existence.  It,  at  the 
same  time,  mirrors  nirvāṇa  and  is  as  such  “defined”  by Madhyamaka  as 








AKB  = Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya  (1970).  Shastri,  S.  D.  (ed.),  in: Abhidharmakośa  (& 
Bhāṣya) of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra, Baud-
dha Bharati Series – 5, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1993), A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: Pāli Text, Translation 
& Explanatory Guide, BPS, Kandy.












Jayatilleke, K. N. (reprint: 2004), Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, Motilal Banarsi-
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Hawaii Press, Honolulu.




















vati bhūtvā ca prativigacchatīti/ asti karmāsti 
vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imāṃś 
ca skandhān nikṣipaty anyāṃś ca skandhān 
pratisaṃdadhātyanyatra dharmasaṃketāt/ 
… anyatradharmasaṃketād iti/ atrāyaṃ 
dharmasaṃketo yad utāsmin satīdaṃ bha-
vati/ asyotpādād idam utpadyate/ yad idam 
avidyāpratyayāḥ … tatrāsminn asatīdaṃ na 
bhavati/ asya nirodhād idaṃ nirudhyate …
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Etymologically,  saṃketa  comes  from  sam-
√CIT,	“to	observe	 together”	or	“to	agree	 to-
gether”,	and	so	it	is	semantically	close	to	Pāli	
sammuti	 (from	 sam√MAN,	 “to	 think	 toget-
her”) in a sense of general agreement.
24
Dve saccāni akkhāsi sambuddho vadataṃ 
varo sammutiṃ paramatthañ ca tatiyaṃ 
n’ūpalabbhati sanketavacanaṃ saccaṃ lo-
kasammutikāraṇaṃ paramatthavacanaṃ sac-









In PP 492.8  (Vṛtti  to MMK 24. 8),  saṃketa 
appears in the third “meaning” of saṃvṛti as 
(commonly  accepted)  expressions:  saṃvṛtiḥ 
saṃketo lokavyavahāra  –  “saṃvṛti  (means) 
conventional  worldly  designation”,  such  as, 
e.g.,  “name,  the  named  (the  object  of  nam-













Kiṁ saṁvṛtervyavasthānaṁ vaktavyam? 
idaṁpratyayatāmātreṇa saṁvṛteḥ siddhira-
bhyupagamyate,  PP.  54.24  –  “How  to  de-
clare  the  establishment of  the  conventional? 
The  establishment  (proof)  of  the  conven-
tional  is obtained by (the fact of) mere con-





ing  [i.e.,  conditioning;  cf.  a more  usual  ex-
pression parasparāpekṣā] each other.”
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The  statement  asmin satīdaṃ bhavati,  etc., 
is  perfectly  in  conformity with ordinary hu-
man  experience  and  does  not  go  “beyond 
convention”  (cf.  sāmaññaṃ nātidhāveyya, 
M.  3.  230),  for  it  is  clear  to  everyone  that 
from  a  certain  seed  a  certain  fruit  emerges, 
that  where  there  are  harsh words  animosity 
inevitable  occurs,  etc.  These  are  observable 
facts and there is nothing obscure about them. 
Obscurity  and  contradictions  emerge,  as  is 
pointed out by Madhyamaka, when we try to 
impute (samāropa) to them certain “rational” 
or metaphysical  categories  (of  the  svabhāva 
type), which, instead of offering an explana-
tion, only obscure  the bare and plain fact of 
asmin satīdaṃ bhavati,  etc.  Thus,  various 
“theories”  (dṛṣṭi)  emerge  “about”  reality, 
i.e.,  causality  (svayaṃkṛtam,  paraṃkṛtam, 
etc.).  In  trying  to  “secure”  this plain  fact  of 
conditionality from “non-referential” imputa-
tions,	Candrakīrti	 says	 that	 “because	of	 [the	
undesirable]  consequence  of  substantialism 
and because it cannot be [otherwise] argued, 
[saṃvṛti is established by refuting a] fourfold 
thesis  [cf. MMK 1.1]”, na tu pakṣacatuṣṭay
ābhyupagamena sasvabhāvavādaprasaṅgāt, 
tasya cāyuktatvāt,  PP.  54.24–25.  Garfield’s 
(2003:  15)  observations  are  very  appealing 
in  respect  of  this  issue:  “Penetrating  to  the 
depths of being, we find ourselves back on the 






What  follows  is  taken  from  Sasaki  (1992: 
111–112); cf. also 109–110.
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To  my  knowledge,  Ābhidharmikas’s  at-
tempt  to  interpret  PS  explicitly  in  terms 
of  the  two  truths  is  the  only  such  attempt. 
Saṃghabhadra,  just  as  Mādhyamikas  (e.g., 
Buddhapālita),	 understands	 the	 canonical	
treatment of PS to be conventional (saṃvṛti, 
saṃketa)  in a sense that  it  refers only to  the 
arising  and  ceasing  of  psycho-physical  phe-
nomena  (the  three  lives’  explanation).  But, 
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Goran Kardaš
O nekim doktrinarnim prijeporima 
u ranim buddhističkim interpretacijama  
»su-nastajanja u zavisnosti« (pratītyasamutpāda)
Sažetak
Pratītyasamutpāda (»su-nastajanje u zavisnosti«) temeljno je buddhističko učenje koje Budd-
ha naziva »srednjim putom« između ontoloških ekstrema egzistencije i neegzistencije. Unatoč 
tome, rani buddhistički filozofi nisu postigli konsenzus u pogledu njegova točnoga doktrinarnog 
ili čak gramatičkog značenja. U ovome članku dajem osnovne linije tih prijepora među ranim 
buddhističkim školama, temeljene na primarnim izvorima, nastojeći pokazati da oni zapravo 




Zu einigen doktrinellen Unstimmigkeiten 
in frühen buddhistischen Interpretationen  
des „Mit-Entstehens in Abhängigkeit“ (pratītyasamutpāda)
Zusammenfassung
Die pratītyasamutpāda („Mit-Entstehen in Abhängigkeit“) ist die grundlegende buddhistische 
Lehre, welche Buddha den „Mittleren Weg“ zwischen ontologischen Extremen der Existenz und 
Nichtexistenz nennt. Nichtsdestotrotz erreichten die frühen buddhistischen Philosophen keinen 





tikel erläutere ich die Grundlinien dieser Unstimmigkeiten zwischen den frühen buddhistischen 
Schulen, die auf primären Quellen fußen, indem ich zu schildern trachte, dass eigentlich diese 
Unstimmigkeiten ihre auseinandergehenden Auffassungen des Problems der Verursachung und 
Natur von Phänomenen widerspiegeln.
Schlüsselwörter
Verursachung, Madhyamaka, Phänomene (Dharmas), pratītyasamutpāda,	Vaibhāṣika, Vasubandhu
the  sphere  of  the  “psycho-physical”, which, 
when analysed properly (paramārthatas), re-
veals itself as a complicated causal structure 
bearing  on  such  functions  imagined  as  real 
(sat), as actuality (kāritra), potentiality or ca-
pability  (sāmarthya),  etc. Mādhyamikas,  on 
the other hand, insists on the conventionality 
of causation itself (“arising and ceasing”, i.e., 
saṃvṛti=idaṃpratyayatā,  cf.  n.  29  above) 
and  provides  a  completely  new  rendering 
of  PS  as  a  “non-arising”  (non-ceasing,  etc.) 
paramārthatas  (a qualification which is per-
sistently	 applied	 by	 Bhāviveka	 and	 not	 by	




two  (exegetical)  levels  –  suttantabhājanīya 
(according  to  canonical  discourses)  and 
abhidhammabhājanīya  (according  to  “more 





while  abhidhammabhājanīya  views  all  the 
limbs  of  PS  as  functions  in  each  and  every 
“thought  moment”  (viññānakhaṇa)  atempo-
rally  (i.e.,  causally),  systematically applying 















It  is  not  even  clear whether  PS  counts  only 
for conscious beings having in mind its “ab-





earliest  strata,  this  “concept”  “addresses  the 
workings of the mind alone” (2008: 299), and 
that the idappaccayatā, at least at this initial 
stage,  does  not  refer  to  the  general  or  “ab-
stract” causation principle of all “things” (not 
just mental or related to the mental), because 
it  [idappaccayatā]  “never  occurs  detached 
from  the  articulation of  the 12  links”  (ibid., 






count  for  non-living  or  non-human  “things” 
as well,  although  this  is  understandable  be-
cause of the well-known reason (the problem 
of  suffering)  that  Buddha  did  not  care  for 
“the  world”  outside  the  human  domain,  re-
ferring  only  occasionally  to  the  appearance 
of causal processes  in  the natural world and 
always by analogy with causal processes oc-
curring  in  the mental world,  as  for  example 
in S. III 54. Thus, Vasubandhu in Bhāṣya  to 





prākarṣikaḥ sāmbandhikaḥ sattvākhyo ’sat-
tvākhyaśceti bhedaḥ), and the reason why in 
the  sūtras  PS  pertains  only  to  living  beings 
is “to abandon perplexity regarding the past, 
the future and the present” [i.e., “did I or did 
I  not  exist  in  the  past”,  etc.]  –  kimarthaṃ 








(pratyayopāṇibandhatas)  applied  to  “outer” 






from  a  seed  (via  a  sprout,  a  leaf,  etc.).  (11) 
The conditional relation regarding this causal 














Sur quelques difficultés doctrinales 
dans les anciennes interprétations 
de la « coproduction conditionnée » (pratītyasamutpāda)
Résumé
Pratītyasamutpāda (« la coproduction conditionnée ») est l’enseignement bouddhique que le 
Bouddha nomme « la voie du milieu » entre deux extrêmes ontologiques, celles d’existence et 
de non-existence. Malgré cela, les anciens philosophes bouddhistes ne sont pas parvenus à un 
consensus autour de sa signification doctrinale précise, voire grammaticale. Dans cet article, 
je livre les traits principaux des difficultés présentes dans les anciennes écoles bouddhistes fon-
dées sur les sources premières, en essayant de montrer qu’en fait, elles reflètent leurs diverses 
compréhensions du problème de causalité et de la nature du phénomène. 
Mots-clés
causalité, Madhyamaka, phénomènes (dharma), pratītyasamutpāda,	Vaibhāṣika, Vasubandhu
in  Peṭakopadesa),  hetu  is  further  identi-
fied  with  sabhāva,  asādhāraṇa  (not  shared 
in  common),  and  pratyaya (paccaya)  with 





“mental  law”  (citta-niyama),  “kammic  law” 
(kamma-niyama),  and  “dhammic  law”  (for 




it  is  true,  as  Shulman  illustrates,  that  in  the 
earliest  sources  the  explication  of  PS  (and 
















[have  achieved]  complete  cessation  of  dif-
fuseness of naming and of other [alike] signs. 
And  so  this pratītyasamutpāda is  called  the 
[complete] appeasement of diffuseness.  In  it 




birth,  aging  and  death,  are  prevented  with-




amo’sminniti sa eva pratītyasamutpādaḥ 
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Nietzsche’s Shadow in Sons and Lovers by D. H. Lawrence
Abstract
This paper analyses Friedrich Nietzsche’s understanding of power as the will to power, of 
autonomy as self-becoming, and of dominance as self-overcoming. Wandering through the 
main thoughts of D. H. Lawrence’s novel Sons and Lovers, this paper draws upon the main 
pillars of Nietzsche’s philosophy and tries to ponder Nietzsche’s understanding of power 
and his comprehension of any will to power. Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power 
is closely related to the process of the affirmation of life, the struggle for the achievement 
of nobility of spirit, struggle for the achievement of becoming “poets of our lives” and for 
creating law for ourselves, and to a constant struggle with life for life itself. Lawrence por-
trays the same perspective through the eyes of an artist, abounding with philosophical and 
psychological connotations. Lawrence provides his readers with a Nietzschean perspective 
of free spirits who try to overcome themselves and to create their own law for self-domi-




This  paper  aims  to  highlight  three Nietzschean  concepts  that  appear  in D. 















Lawrence  read German well, and  it  is not unlikely  that his avid  interest  in 
Nietzsche led him to his original works.1 The force that drives his self-crea-
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that  gives  force  to  itself.  It  seems  appropriate  to  speak of  a  strong  resem-
blance between his and Nietzsche’s ethics. From amongst early 20th century 
British writers,  it  is  really only Lawrence who takes Dionysus as seriously 
as Nietzsche might have wished. Both Nietzsche and Lawrence offer elabo-
rate worldviews, including political blueprints, based on thoroughgoing both 
metaphysical  and personal  irrationalism. Both were overwhelmed with  the 
urgency of their “transvaluation” (in their later works, occasionally causing 
a shrill tone, a loss of moral balance, the most universal sign of the modem 















































The will  is  not  only  a  complex of  sensation  and  thought,  but  above  all  an 





prisonment, self-centeredness and  love. This  form of  freedom develops out 
























time. They were as follows: Beyond Good and 
Evil, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Twilight of the 
Idols, The Antichrist, The Birth of Tragedy, 
The Future of Our Educational Institutions, 
Human, All Too Human, The Will to Power, 
and The Gay Science.  (Rose Marie Burwell, 
“Catalogue  of  D.  H.  Lawrence’s  Reading 
from Early Childhood”, D. H. Lawrence Re-
view, 3/1970, p. 207.)
2


























































































rything.19  Lawrence  shows  this  perspective  through  Miriam  because  she 












life-denying. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche delineates the central polar-
ity in terms of Greek deities. Namely, the opposing forces are Apollo, who 
contains “the glorious divine  image of  the principium individuationis”,  the 
principle of individuation, and Dionysus, who is “brought home to us most 










Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Mo-
rals (hereinafter referred to as GM), III, 17.
12
In  slightly different  terms,  the  theory of  the 




























as  the principium  individuationis,  distances  himself  from  the  horror  of  the 
vision of the individual’s annihilation by interposing a protective veil of self-
contained  art,  ethical  self-knowledge  and  self-moderation.  Nevertheless,  a 

















































































and  Irrationalism”, Neophilologus,  1/1985, 
pp. 15–16.
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D.  H.  Lawrence,  Psychoanalysis and the 































valued  artistry  as  the good will  to  appearance,  as  something necessary  for 
supporting one’s active immersion in life and for maintaining the will to self-
responsibility. Successful artistry is also a form of self-discovery – it is the 




















For Nietzsche,  art makes  life bearable;  for Lawrence,  art puts us  in a new 
relationship with the universe.
In Lawrence’s  sense,  all  things, both human and  inhuman,  seek  self-fulfil-
ment beyond mere  survival.  In  the  same way as Nietzsche, Lawrence also 
advances the joyous affirmation of earthly existence, our own nature and that 
which  is around us. The autonomous person  is a  free  spirit who actualises 
drives towards self-overcoming and lives his life authentically. Man must be 
suppressed. Nietzsche pleads with us to be at least warriors. As each person 










of  its  emasculated  feature  and  blamed  effeminacy  on  humanitarian  ideals. 





















































David Thatcher, Nietzsche in England 1890–
















































































The  true  realisation  of  the will  to  power,  genuine  freedom,  has  been  con-


























che Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe,  ed. 
by  G.  Colli  and  M.  Montinari,  De  Gruyter 
– DTV, Berlin 1999, 8, 19(40), p. 340.
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Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Nachlass  1884/1885; 



























D. H. Lawrence, The Letters of D. H. Law-
rence, The Cambridge Edition of the Letters 






















section of The Will to Power, “Nietzsche insists throughout that we must ‘em-
ploy’ (in Dienst nehmen) our impulses and not weaken or destroy them”.64
In  the novel Sons and Lovers, Lawrence presents  fight  for dominance pri-
marily through the man–woman relationship. For him, this relationship has 



































tion.  For man’s  possession was  “a  great moment  in  life”.72 Miriam,  as  a 
woman,  is arguing for something beyond, something more  in him, some-
thing deeper.
Nietzsche  holds  that  women  naturally  like  peace  and  comfort,  while men 





















Walter  Kaufman,  Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist,  Princeton  Univer-
sity Press, New Jersey 1974, p. 194.
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D. H. Lawrence, The Letters of D. H. Law-
rence, p. 248.
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“natural” qualities. Thus,  readers  find  themselves associated with  the male 
principle through the following: the will  to motion, change, activity, multi-
plicity and diversity, knowledge, mind, spirit, and light; and with the female 
principle  through  these:  the will  to  inertia,  stability,  permanence,  oneness, 
feeling, body, and darkness.93









































D.  H.  Lawrence, Phoenix: The Posthumous 






























































overcoming obstacles and challenges  in  life, people prove  their strength of 
character which brings the greatest rewards and creativity.
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Vesna Stanković Pejnović, Živojin Đurić
Nietzscheova sjena u Sinovima i ljubavnicima D. H. Lawrencea
Sažetak
Rad analizira Nietzscheovo razumijevanje moći kao volje	za	moć i autonomije kao samoposta-
janja, s jedne strane, te dominacije, kao samonadilaženja, s druge strane. Naglašavajući glavne 
misli Lawrenceova romana Sinovi i ljubavnici, rad se oslanja na glavne stupove Nietzscheove 
filozofije, pokušavajući proniknuti u njegovo razumijevanje moći i svake volje za moć. Nietzsche-
ovo razumijevanje volje za moć usko je povezano s procesom samoafirmacije, borbe za ostva-
renje plemstva duha, te njegovim vlastitim riječima, pothvatom postajanja »pjesnikom vlastitog 
života« i stvaranjem vlastitih zakona te konstantnom borbom sa životom za sam život. Lawrence 
prikazuje istu perspektivu očima umjetnika s mnogo filozofskih i psiholoških konotacija. Lawren-
ce dijeli sa čitaocima Nietzscheovu perspektivu shvaćanja slobodnog duha koji pokušava nadići 
sebe te stvoriti vlastite zakone samodominacije te dominacije nad svijetom koji ga okružuje.
Ključne riječi
Friedrich Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, Sinovi i ljubavnici,	volja	za	moć,	autonomija,	dominacija
Vesna Stanković Pejnović, Živojin Đurić
Nietzsches Schatten in D. H. Lawrences Söhne und Liebhaber
Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz analysiert Nietzsches Verständnis der Macht als Wille zur Macht und der Autonomie 
als Selbstwerdung einerseits, und der Domination als Selbstüberwindung andererseits. Indem 
er die Hauptgedanken von Lawrences Roman Söhne und Liebhaber akzentuiert, lehnt sich die-
ser Aufsatz an die Hauptsäulen der Philosophie Nietzsches an, wobei er seinen Standpunkt zur 
Macht und jeglichem Willen zur Macht zu ergründen sucht. Nietzsches Erfassung des Willens 
zur Macht ist eng verknüpft mit dem Prozess der Selbstaffirmation, des Kampfes um die Ver-
wirklichung des Geistesadels. Sie ist, um es mit seinen eigenen Worten auszudrücken, ebenso 
verknüpft mit der Unternehmung, „Dichter des eigenen Lebens“ zu werden, sowie mit der Schaf-
fung eigener Gesetze und dem Dauerkampf mit dem Leben um das Leben selbst. Lawrence stellt 
dieselbe Betrachtungsweise mit dem künstlerischen Auge dar, mit zahlreichen philosophischen 
und psychologischen Konnotationen. Lawrence teilt mit den Lesern Nietzsches Anschauung vom 
Verständnis des freien Geistes, der sich selbst zu überwinden und eigene Gesetze zu schaffen 







Vesna Stanković Pejnović, Živojin Đurić
L’ombre nietzschéenne dans Amants et Fils de D. H. Lawrence
Résumé
D’une part, ce travail analyse la compréhension nietzschéenne de la puissance comme vo-
lonté de puissance et l’autonomie comme auto-devenir, et d’autre part, il analyse la domination 
comme auto-dépassement. En accentuant les pensées principales du roman Amants et Fils de 
Lawrence, ce travail s’appuie sur les piliers principaux de la philosophie nietzschéenne et tente 
de pénétrer sa compréhension de la puissance et de chaque volonté de puissance. La compré-
hension de la volonté de puissance de Nietzsche est étroitement liée au processus d’auto-affir-
mation – lutte pour réaliser la noblesse de l’âme –, à une entreprise pour devenir « poète de 
notre vie » et à une création de nos propres lois, comme il l’affirmait lui-même, mais encore, à 
une lutte constante avec la vie pour la vie elle-même. Lawrence présente la même perspective 
à travers un regard d’artiste rempli de connotations philosophiques et psychologiques. Il par-
tage avec Nietzsche sa perspective d’une conception de l’esprit libre qui tente de se dépasser 












Eine „Philosophie von der Sprache her“
Max Gottschlich (Hrsg.), Die drei Revolutionen der Denkart. Systema-
tische Beiträge zum Denken von Bruno Liebrucks, Verlag Karl Alber, 
Freiburg – München 2013
Zusammenfassung
Stefan George dichtete den Vers: „Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht“. Das Sprachdenken 
von Bruno Liebrucks (1911–1986) kann als die Philosophie zu diesem Vers verstanden wer-
den. Diese kreist in weitausholenden wie dichten Kommentaren zu Herder, Humboldt, Kant, 
Hegel und anderen Philosophen um den Gedanken, dass es für den Menschen ein Außer-
halb der Sprache nicht gibt. Von so etwas wissen wir nur innerhalb der Sprache. Liebrucks 
verallgemeinert diesen Gedanken auf die Mittedisziplin der Philosophie, die Logik, indem 
er sagt: „Nur innerhalb des Begriffs gibt es etwas, das außerhalb des Begriffs existiert“.
Der hier besprochene Tagungsband widmet sich in affirmativer, apologetischer, aber auch 
kritischer Hin- bzw. Absicht dieser fundamentalphilosophischen These und deren Relevanz 
für alle philosophischen Disziplinen. Denn es leuchtet ein, dass sich, wenn das stimmt, die 
Szene in Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Ethik, Ästhetik und anderen philosophischen Sparten 
zur Gänze ändert bzw. als anders als bisher angesehen und verstanden werden muss. Die 
große Frage lautet daher: Handelt es sich bei der Liebrucksschen Anstrengung des Be-
griffs wirklich um einen gelungenen Nachweis von Revolutionen der Denkungsart oder um 
eine durch Überdehnung des Sprachbegriffs bewirkte Restitution längst vergangener (wenn 
überhaupt jemals geteilter), von uns Heutigen aber nicht oder nicht mehr für wahr zu hal-











Herausgeber  des  hier  zu  besprechenden  Sammelbandes, Max  Gottschlich, 
dazu bewogen haben, von Bruno Liebrucks (1911–1986) als von einem „der 














bei  hat  Liebrucks  selbst  auf  seine Darstellungsart  („Methode“)  als  auf  ein 
„sphärenmischende[s] Komponieren“, als „Komposition von Kommentar und 






























































Vgl.  die  alle  Mehrdeutigkeit  ausnutzende 
Frage „Warum kommt es nicht zur Sprache?“, 
von der die Liebruckssche „Anstrengung lebt“ 
(Bruno Liebrucks, Sprache und Bewußtsein, 












Erkenntnis und Dialektik. Zu einer Einfüh-
rung in die Philosophie von der Sprache her. 







an  einem  Bewusstsein  aus,  das  glaubt,  die 
Sprache als objektivierbaren Gegenstand ver-
stehen zu können. Es handelt sich bei diesem 
Ansatz  also  nicht  um  ‚Sprach-Philosophie‘ 











denheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und 
ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung 
des Menschengeschlechts, a. a. O., VII, S. 46. 
– Josef Simon macht in seiner Studie „Spra-
che bei Kant“, Revue Roumaine de Philoso-
phie 39, 1–2  (1995), S. 79, darauf aufmerk-
sam, dass „Sprache“ „ihrem allgemeinen Be-









































Schon  von  daher  erweist  es  sich,  dass  der  ‚un-  oder  übergegenständliche‘ 










Fritz Zimbrich bringt in seinem Beitrag „Die Götter Hölderlins wohnen im 


















Werner  Schmitt  bemerkt  in  seinem  Beitrag 
„Liebrucks’ Umwege zu Hölderlin“, S. 154, 
zu diesem Punkt: „Die Verwesentlichung ge-
schieht  durch  Fixierung  der  Sprache  in  der 
Schrift.  Die  im  aktualen  Gespräch  gespro-
chenen und gehörten Worte sind die Form des 
lebendigen Geistes. In der schriftlichen Fixie-
rung  haben wir  die  Nachricht  von  ihm,  der 
einmal lebendig war und nun in den Zeichen 
über lange Zeit in der wesentlichen Möglich-





Platon,  Phaidon,  99  c9–d1;  Josef  Simon 





















aber  auch  dadurch  gerechtfertigt,  dass,  wie 
Theodoros  Penolidis  in  seinem Beitrag  „Zu 















verführt  „uns,  sie  in  der  Reflexion  auf  sie 
auch als Seiendes“, als Gegenstand „zu ver-
stehen“  (Josef  Simon,  „Sprache  als Zeichen 
betrachtet“,  in:  Sprache denken. Positionen 
aktueller Sprachphilosophie,  hg. von  Jürgen 
Trabant, Frankfurt am Main 1995, S. 99).
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Josef  Simon,  „Kritik  der  Urteilsform“,  in: 
Was sich nicht sagen lässt. Das Nicht-Begriff-




B. Liebrucks, Sprache und Bewußtsein, Bd. 1, 
a. a. O., 4. – Dieser Gedanke ist vielleicht der 
stärkste  und  beste Ausdruck  für  die  Grund-
struktur  dessen,  was  man  im  emphatischen 
Sinn unter Dialektik  zu verstehen hat. Nach 
Liebrucks  gilt  sogar:  „Der Mensch  hat  nie-
mals  anders  als dialektisch gedacht“  (Bruno 
Liebrucks,  Sprache und Bewußtsein, Bd. 4, 
Frankfurt  am  Main  1968,  S.  IX).  Entspre-
chend wird man  dialektisches Denken  nicht 
als  veraltet  oder  gar  überholt,  sondern  als 
Manifestationsform allen Erkennens ansehen 
können. Als  Beispiel  für  die  Unverbraucht-
heit  bzw. Unverbrauchbarkeit  von Dialektik 
mag hier eine Stelle aus Thomas Sören Hoff-
manns Philosophische Physiologie. Eine Sys-
tematik des Begriffs der Natur im Spiegel der 
Geschichte der Philosophie, Stuttgart – Bad 










John Rogers Searle, Die Konstruktion der ge-













Wichtig  scheint  mir  vor  allem,  dass,  wie  Zimbrich  ausdrücklich  anmerkt, 







wohlunterschiedene Dinge  oder Sachen,  denen wir  dann  in  einem zweiten 
Schritt  einen Namen  geben  oder  sie  so  im weitesten  Sinn  bezeichnen.  Im 
Lichte solcher Erwägungen erscheint die Liebruckssche Philosophie von der 










„Verhältni[ses]  des Allgemeinen  und Einzelnen“,  d.  h.  um die Lösung  des 
„méthexis-Problem[s]“  (48).  Diese  Neubestimmung  besteht  in  der  Über-
windung der sokratischen (und auch noch vom mittleren Platon vertretenen) 
Annahme  des  (wahren)  „Sein[s]  als  abgetrennte[r]  Allegemeinheit“  (40), 




































Damit  hat Kant,  so Gottschlich,  die  „Einsicht“  gewonnen,  „dass  die Glei-
chung: Logik = formale Logik falsch ist“ (50), dass also der „Absolutheits-
















„…  durch  das  Ernstnehmen  des  Erkenntnisanspruches  formaler  Logik,  den  alles  Denken, 
das bei Verstand bleiben will, immer schon voraussetzt. Zur Dialektik[28] gelangen wir durch 
das Ernstnehmen der transzendentalen Logik, wodurch es möglich wird, die formallogischen 




man wissen, was  es  außerhalb  oder  jenseits 
der Sprache nicht gibt? Man kann auch sagen: 
Für uns gibt es außerhalb der Sprache nichts; 
obwohl  auch  das  einer  kritischen  Reflexion 
kaum standhalten wird. Es so weit zu treiben 
und anzunehmen, dass es außerhalb der Spra-
che  und  also  quasi  an sich,  beispielsweise, 







Bruno  Liebrucks,  Platons Entwicklung zur 
Dialektik. Untersuchungen zum Problem des 
Eleatismus, Frankfurt am Main 1949.
24





Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 
XXVI, Anm. – Das ist übrigens – in anderen 




B. Liebrucks, Sprache und Bewußtsein, Bd. 4, 
a. a. O., S. IXf.
28
Die  (Hegelsche)  Dialektik  stellt  die  „dritte 
Revolution  der Denk(ungs)art“,  nämlich  die 






(Das  Selbstbewusstsein  der  formalen  Logik  erfährt,  sich  so  auszudrücken, 
gleichsam eine Kränkung, indem ihm vorgeworfen wird, sich nicht ihren ei-
genen Gesetzen  zu  unterwerfen  und  dergestalt  aus  der  Pflicht  des  lógon 
dídonai  zu  stehlen.  Sie  hält  ihre  Gesetze  quasi  nicht  nur  für  unantastbar, 
sondern für unansprechbar.) Wenn, wie Liebrucks schreibt, „[d]er Mensch“ 












der  formalen Logik,  sondern  auch der Dialektik.  So  können wir  beispiels-
weise Klaus Honrath (Bruno Liebrucks und Immanuel Kant. Die Logik, das 











Hier  hilft  auch  nicht  Honraths  Verweis  auf  eine  Nachlassreflexion  Kants, 
nach der wir unser Urteil „in suspenso lassen“34 (105) sollen. Kant wendete 
sich mit dieser Forderung gegen das vorschnelle Urteil bzw. gab zu bedenken, 





























bewusstseins  als Moment der wirklichen Freiheit  zeigt  sich  im Durchgang 
durch die Kantische Rechtslehre“ (107), möchte man hinzufügen: hoffentlich 
nicht nur dort, sondern auch unabhängig davon in der allgemeinen Menschen-







„zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung schicken“36 kann, ist unmoralisch und böse; 









von Thomas Sören Hoffmann. Unter der Überschrift Die Betrachtung der Ka-






B. Liebrucks, Sprache und Bewußtsein, Bd. 4, 
a. a. O., S. IX.
30





6. Bandes von Sprache und Bewußtsein: Der 
menschliche Begriff. Sprachliche Genesis der 
Logik, logische Genesis der Sprache.
32
Vgl. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Enzyk-
lopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 
(1830),  §  31, Anm.:  „Ohnehin  ist  die  Form 











I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 61.
36






philosophischer  Perspektive,  das  –  aus  der  Sicht Hegels  –  zwar  sicherlich 
geistphilosophisch, aber nur mit erheblichen Einschränkungen auch logisch 
gerechtfertigt  werden  kann“  (114).  (Dieses  Ineinanderschieben  bzw.  diese 
Verschränkung findet bei Liebrucks ihren prägnanten Ausdruck im Unterti-
tel  des  der  „Wissenschaft  der  Logik“  gewidmeten  6.  Bandes  von Sprache 
und Bewußtsein: Sprachliche Genesis der Logik, logische Genesis der Spra-
che.) Zwar sei, so Hoffmann, „die Hegelsche Logik, wenn sie zur Frage wird, 

















zum  anderen,  dass  sie  „als  selbst  ersprochene  Daseinsweise  des  Geistes“ 
„ihrerseits  dessen  Funktion“  (120)  ist.  Beide  Funktionen  nicht  „angemes-
sen“ (121) zu unterscheiden und also „unmittelbar[]“ zu verschränken birgt 
nach Hoffmann unter  anderem die Gefahr  „des Sprachrelativismus“  (120), 








„Die Logik  als  solche,  d.  h.  die  reine  ‚Innerung‘  des Begriffs,  die  doch  nicht  in  einen  Pla-
tonismus der Wesenheiten, sondern in eine Innerung des absoluten Begreifens mündet, bedarf 
































schon  sagen,  con amore  verfasste  Studie  von Simone Liedtke Freiheit als 
Marionette Gottes. Eine Untersuchung über den Gottesbegriff im Werk von 




be  gilt  auch  für  die Versuche  von Werner Schmitt  (Liebrucks’ Umwege zu 
Hölderlin, 144–168), Werner Woschnak (Liebrucks’ Interpretation von Her-
der und Gehlen, 171–200) und Maria Woschnak („Handle sprachlich“ – Zur 
Ethik bei Bruno Liebrucks, 201–220).
Von der eingangs behaupteten Profundität des Liebrucksschen Denkens kann 






der Logik  konnte  Hegel  gemeint  haben,  als 




Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, „Vorrede zur 
zweiten Ausgabe“,  GW,  XXI,  S.  20).  Hoff-




losophischen Wissenschaften  (1830),  §  462 
(mdl. Zusatz): „Ohne Worte denken zu wol-
len,  wie  Mesmer  einmal  versucht  hat,  er-
scheint  […]  als  eine  Unvernunft,  die  jenen 
Mann seiner Versicherung nach, beinahe zum 
Wahnsinn geführt hätte. Es  ist  aber auch  lä-
cherlich,  das  Gebundensein  des  Gedankens 
an  das Wort  für  einen Mangel  des  ersteren 
und für ein Unglück anzusehen.“
39
Bruno  Liebrucks,  Sprache und Bewußtsein, 
Bd. 6/1, Frankfurt am Main 1974, S. 165.
40
Vgl.  im vorliegenden Band:  J.  Simon,  „Ab-
soluter  Geist  und  Persönlichkeit“,  S.  294: 
„Im  Mythos  sieht  Liebrucks  die  sinnliche 
Gestaltung  des  Logos  als  logisch  absolute 
Idee. Die griechischen Götter seien ‚niemals 
realiter existierende Einzelgestalten gewesen, 
sondern  sinnliche  Allgemeinbegriffe‘“.  Die 
in diesem Zitat zitierte Stelle ist entnommen 














Jedna »filozofija iz jezika samoga«
Sažetak
Stefan George napisao je stih: »Nijedna stvar ne može biti tamo gdje riječ nedostaje«. Mišljenje 
jezika Brune Liebrucksa (1911.–1986.) može se shvatiti kao filozofija ovoga stiha. Ona naširoko 
– primjerice, u opsežnim komentarima Herdera, Humboldta, Kanta, Hegela i drugih filozofa 
– kruži oko misli da za čovjeka ne postoji ništa izvan jezika. O nečemu saznajemo samo unutar 
jezika. Liebrucks proširuje ovu misao na središnju disciplinu filozofije, logiku, pri čemu kaže: 
»Samo unutar pojma ima nečega što egzistira izvan pojma«.
Zbornik radova o kojemu ovdje raspravljamo fokusira se – s afirmativnim, apologetskim, ali i 
kritičkim pogledom i namjerom – na ovu fundamentalnofilozofijsku tezu i njezinu relevantnost 
za sve filozofijske discipline. Naime, ako ta teza stoji, ispostavlja se da se scena u logici, spo-
znajnoj teoriji, etici, estetici i drugim dijelovima filozofije u potpunosti mijenja, odnosno mora 
ju se promatrati i razumijevati drugačije nego do sada. Stoga veliko pitanje glasi: radi li se u 
Liebrucksovu naporu pojma doista o uspješnom dokazu revolucija načina mišljenja ili pak o 
jednoj restituciji izazvanoj prenaprezanjem pojma jezika – restituciji davno prošlih (ako ikad 





A “Philosophy from the Language Itself”
Abstract
Stefan George wrote a verse: “Where word breaks off no thing may be”. Bruno Liebrucks’ 
(1911–1986) thoughts on language can be understood as the philosophy behind this verse. It 
widely circles, as dense commentaries of Herder, Humboldt, Kant, Hegel, and other philoso-
phers, around the thought that for human beings nothing exists outside language. We get to 
know something only within language. Liebrucks extends this thought on the central discipline 
of philosophy – logic – by stating: “Only within the concept there is something which exists 
outside the concept.”
The book of proceedings discussed in this paper focuses – with an affirmative, apologetic, but 
also a critical view and intent – on this fundamental philosophical thesis and its relevance to all 
philosophical disciplines. For it is clear that, if this thesis is true, the scene in logic, epistemo-
logy, ethics, aesthetics, and other branches of philosophy becomes entirely changed, i.e. it must 
be considered and understood differently than it has been hitherto. Hence the great question 
arises: Is Liebrucks’ effort of the concept really a successful proof of the revolutions of the ways 
of thinking or is it a case of restitution, caused by overstretching the concept of language, of 
bygone (if ever shared at all) views on language and world that we today do not (or no longer) 








Une « philosophie à partir du seul langage »
Résumé
Stefan George a écrit le vers : « Aucune chose ne soit, là où le mot faillit ». L’idée du langage 
de Bruno Liebrucks (1911–1986) peut être comprise en tant que philosophie de ce vers. De par 
les nombreux commentaires tels que ceux de Herder, Humboldt, Kant, Hegel mais également 
d’autres philosophes, cette philosophie tourne autour de la pensée que pour l’homme il n’existe 
rien au-dehors du concept. On découvre toute chose uniquement grâce à la langue. Liebrucks 
élargit cette pensée au champ de la logique, discipline philosophique centrale, et par là affirme 
que « c’est seulement au-dedans du concept que quelque chose existe au-dehors du concept ».
Le recueil de travaux dont il est ici question se focalise – au travers d’un regard et d’un dessein 
affirmatifs et apologétiques, mais aussi critiques – sur cette thèse philosophique fondamentale 
et sur sa pertinence pour toutes les disciplines philosophiques. En effet, si cette thèse est cor-
recte, il s’avère que le domaine de la logique, de la théorie de la connaissance, de l’éthique, 
de l’esthétique et de d’autres branches philosophiques changent dans leur totalité, c’est-à-dire 
qu’il va falloir concevoir et comprendre la philosophie d’une manière autre que celle conçue 
et comprise jusqu’à présent. Ainsi, la grande question est la suivante: s’agit-il réellement dans 
l’effort du concept de Liebrucks d’une preuve de révolution réussie dans la manière de penser, 
ou d’une restitution causée par une distorsion du concept du langage, à savoir d’une restitu-
tion des regards longtemps abandonnés (peut-être jamais divisés) sur le monde et le langage 
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politics  they  give  rise  to.  He  is  particularly 
interested  in  the  aesthetic  intersections  of 














power  is  a  kind  of  metaphysical  substance, 






introduces  us  to Foucault’s  theoretical work 
and  demonstrates  its  application  to  Kafka’s 
novel The Trial and short story In the Penal 
Colony, he focuses on the possibility of self-










and  this  is  the  core  of  his  new  ethics.  This 
review has  taken  on  the  task  of  introducing 
inextensively  the  possibility  of  synthesising 
Foucault’s  theoretical  positions  and Kafka’s 
life as a work of art.
We  can  understand  discourse  as  the  mise-
en-scène  of  the  interplay  of  power.  In  other 
words,  every  disciplinary  power  requires  a 









and  disciplining  individuals.  Distortion  was 














no Kafka’s  true  self  outside  his  actions,  his 
life  as  a work of  art. Discourse  is  arranged, 
Dungey  argues,  so  that  it  better  serves  the 
purposes  of  surveillance,  normalising,  and 
disciplinary  power.  Space  and  time  are  also 





















disciplinary  power works  in Kafka.  For  ex-





story  is  a  place  of  the  distribution  of  disci-




given  situation.  In The Trial,  Joseph K.  has 
failed to use the authority  that  the person of 
his  social  standing  should  have. He was  ar-
rested  for a crime he was not aware of, and 
could  not  defend  himself  because  he  was 
denied information about the same. The two 
men that came to arrest him were  instructed 
not  to  give  him  any  information  about  his 
arrest. Dungey argues that we are always al-
ready arrested, and that Kafka wrote his novel 
with  this  in mind. There  is  no metaphysical 
self  that  can be excluded  from  the  interplay 
of power, no lethargic and objective watcher. 













if  even  the  most  (seemingly)  unquestion-
able parts of one’s soul can be destroyed and 
recreated.  The  predisposition  to  understand 
these  remote  parts  of  one’s  soul,*  and  the 
operation  to  recreate  them  is what  Foucault 




ating  and  destroying  oneself  in  his  famous 
last  fragment  of The Will to Power. This  is 
the new ethics, Nietzsche’s  ethics,  based on 
the  revaluation of  all  values.  It  is  similar  to 
Foucault and Kafka. Dungey quotes the diary 
entries  which,  according  to  him,  prove  that 
Kafka experienced his life in the same pathos 
as Foucault did a few decades later. This pa-


















scure and still  in  flux  that  I cannot even properly 
explain  or  fully  accept  the  dislike  I  feel  for  my-
self.” 
As Dungey also notices, Kafka  is  never de-
luded  into  thinking  that  the  process  is  over, 
that he has reached the highpoint and that his 
everlasting  agonistic misery has  come  to  an 
end. At  this  point,  one  can  also  identify  the 
grounds for the argument that Dungey places 
before the approaches that view Kafka’s true 
self  hidden  somewhere  in  or  between  the 
words  he  wrote.  Kafka  is  a  writer,  and  the 
writer  is,  in fact,  the very act of his writing. 
Kafka needs to write, it is his place of resist-
ance.  Dungey  writes  that  the  diary  entries 
play  a very  important  role  in  the process of 
Kafka’s  self-creation.  By  writing  about  his 
most  inner  feelings  about  life,  family  and 
literature,  he  could  destroy  them  altogether 
and move on in his will to power, understood 
as the moment of self-conditioning. Only by 
writing  the  truth  about  himself  to  himself 
could he start the gigantic project of becom-
ing  the  one  that  he must  be. One must,  ac-











texts,  from  his  diary  entries  to  his  fictional 
work,  we  can  find  different  literary  expres-
sions of the agon consisting in the opposition 
between  disciplinary  power  and  resistance. 
Dungey writes  carefully  and  soberly,  but  at 





book  offers  a  plausible  theoretical  synthesis 












Teaching Plato in Palestine
Philosophy in a Divided World
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donesians,  Spinoza with  Jews  in  the United 
States, Marx with Brazilians and, essentially, 
anthropological  and  bioethical  issues  with 
the Mohawk people  in North America, with 
Plato, Aristotle and Socrates being silent fol-
lowers  since  Palestine.  In  a  special  chapter 
on “Diversity and Debate”, we learn that the 
book is a result of eight years of experience 
of  working  out  a  concept  of  philosophising 
outside  classrooms  and  in  concrete  situa-
























do not  simply possess  ethics,  you  acquire  it 
through learning from a young age and adapt 
yourself to upholding it through nurture.
The  exposition  of  the  content  of  Fraenkel’s 
travels and seminars is a combination of jour-
nalistic  reports  on  people  and  situations  he 
worked in, and a dialogic exchange of know-
ledge and opinions on subjects chosen to be 
discussed  during  seminars,  all  of  which  is 
spiced up with personal details on how he met 
certain people and how the situations he was 
in  came  to  be.  This  includes  less  important 
information on means of travel or Fraenkel’s 








this  sense, whoever  is  looking  for  a  deeper, 




However,  in  light of  its purpose and object-
ives,  this  issue  does  not  matter  because  it 
will  serve  as  guidance  for  teachers  to  come 
and  as  an  interesting  read  to  others, mostly 





including  Fraenkel’s  witty  offerings  of  phi-
losophy  whenever  someone  begins  to  deal 
with absolutes or responds to situations inap-












a  teaching  template  for  bringing  philosophy 
to a broader public and for bringing a broader 
public to philosophy.
In my  personal  view,  what  this  book  really 
does  is  point  towards  an  uncertainly  dubi-










































kel’s  experiences  across  the  world  show  us 
exactly  that.  For  example, when  it  becomes 
obvious  that  discussions  in  Indonesia might 
work  because  there  already  exists  a  certain 
consensus on a means of communication and 
education  in  plural  society,  we  are  again  to 
wonder  whether  philosophy  can  or  cannot 
ever reach the public in a sense that it struc-
turally  embodies  a  healthy  culture,  and  fur-
thermore,  whether  philosophers  can  or  can-
not  ever  operate  philosophically  in  insecure 
conditions.
Can we imagine a philosopher carrying woun-
ded  Palestinian  children  away  from  conflict 
and spending an evening discussing the prob-
lem of  evil  and  theodicy? Or venturing  into 
the Indian slums and getting people to ques-
tion  their  cultural  and  religious  system  or 
their  social  role? Or  explaining  the  use  and 
abuse  of  faith  and  politics  in African  states 
where  every  20  seconds  a  child  dies  from 





concepts  and  all  the  intellectual  potency we 
can muster?  Is  it  possible  that  this  is where 
philosophy could (should) reach its pinnacle, 
not  by  communicating  knowledge,  but  by 
shaping from spoken or written analyses into 




being wisdom  itself? And  yet,  scholars will 
be  offended  by  such  an  idea. This  is  nicely 
described, again in the chapter on Brazil, on 
pages 87 to 89. There is much more that can 
be  discovered  with  Fraenkel’s  book  in  this 
context.  For  example,  the  way  that  certain 
systems  in  culture,  such  as  education,  con-




of  cogs  in  someone’s machine. This  can  be 





of neutral,  sterile  analytics merging  journal-
ism with conceptual design. Fraenkel’s book 
indirectly  outlines  all  these  problems,  and 
provides a number of peculiar situations – on 





information,  it  offers  an  idea  of  philosophi-
cal  education  including  a  number  of  exam-
ples  from  across  the world,  and  it  probably 
indirectly anticipates many projects that will 
occur  in  the  future.  I highly  recommend  the 
following  two  chapters:  “Citizen  Philoso-
phers in Brazil” and “Diversity and Debate”. 





been  addressed properly  yet,  and which has 














in  higher  education  committedly  for  almost 
15 years. This book is primarily the crown of 






In  the  “Foreword”  of Volume  1,  the  author 
explains  his  motives  and  gives  some  tips 
for  reading  the whole work. He  is  aware of 
good translations  into  the Croatian  language 
of some introductions to philosophy, but also 
clearly states that they are often too difficult 
for  non-philosophers,  usually  cover  only  a 
(smaller) part of philosophical problems and 
are  always  determined  by  the  philosophical 
positions  of  the  respective  authors.  These 
reasons motivated him  to  try  to offer  a  sys-
tematic,  yet  at  the  same  time  widely  com-
prehensive introduction to philosophy. If we 







There  is  probably  no  better  way  to  start  an 
introduction to philosophy which at the same 
time wants to be philosophical than to ques-
tion  the meaning  of  life. This  is  the  title  of 
the  first  chapter,  in  which  the  author,  with 




question  and  justifies  its  logic,  he  convinc-
ingly  and  progressively  leads  the  reader  to 
the  optimistic  conclusion  that,  even  if  we 
do not have a  straightforward answer  to  the 




that  the  very meaning  of  human  life  is  in  a 
continuous process of finding and creating its 
meaning.
In  the  second  chapter,  the  author  critically 
analyses Epicurus and Lucretius’s arguments 
for the irrationality of having fear from death, 
concluding  finally  that,  despite  the  fact  that 
these  arguments  are  interesting  and  of  high 
quality, death is something bad for us.
The  third  chapter  entitled  “Destiny”  deals 















author  gives  an  incredibly  clear  and  com-
prehensive  overview  of  the  main  positions 
in  the  discussion  about  free  will:  determin-
ism,  libertarianism  and  compatibilism.  He 
presents  the  core  arguments  of  all  positions 
fairly, critically evaluating their strengths and 




the  distinction  between  values  and  desires, 
we  could  consistently  save  free  will  in  our 
deterministic  mechanical  world,  taking  our 







will,  the author wisely presents  it  in a sepa-
rate  chapter.  Despite  the  complexity  of  the 
discussion,  he  succeeds  in  offering  a  highly 










of moral  responsibility  as  a mode of  reason 
responsiveness.
The chapter on ethics is one of the longest. It 
should  be  stressed  that,  although  ethics  is  a 
classic  topic of every proper  introduction  to 
philosophy and that there are many books on 
ethics and bioethics written in Croatian,  this 
chapter  is  most  probably  the  first  in  trying 

















phy  of  politics.  The  chapter  is  wisely  posi-
tioned  after  the  chapter  on  ethics  because 








tributive  justice, mainly focusing on  the  im-
portant  positions  of  John Rawls  and Robert 
Nozick in the overall discussion. The natural 
lottery argument is discussed at the end.






ing,  philosophical  talk  about  values  is  quite 
demanding, which then requires that readers 
first become habituated to dealing with prob-
lems  philosophically. The  author  decides  to 
present the topic by explaining and elaborat-
ing the distinction between facts and values. 
He concludes  that  it  seems  that  the gulf be-
tween  them  will  always  be  open,  although 
this is exactly the reason why we appreciate 
wisdom and prudence so much, with the two 










and  the  different  ways  in  which  our  know-
ledge can be grounded. Part two is dedicated 
to scepticism, a crucial challenge to any epi-
stemological  theory  (theory  of  knowledge). 
The  other  three  parts  present  three  different 
responses  to  sceptics:  foundationalism  and 
its attempt to find a foundational, irreducible 
ground  of  all  our  knowledge;  coherentism 





The  following  chapter  entitled  “Reality” 








the  said  positions,  arguing  that  the  question 
about the real existence of the external world 
is simply – meaningless.
The  philosophy  of  mind  is  the  topic  of  the 
chapter  entitled  “Mind”.  After  discussing 
the question whether some of the differences 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical  (such 
as  extensions  in  space,  intentionality,  ratio-
nality and privileged access) are  real or  just 
putative,  the  author presents  all  the  relevant 





mental  properties,  but  only  as  a  type  of  the 
physical, or as being reductive to the physical 
(physicalism  and  functionalism).  Although 








The  chapter  on  “God”  introduces  the  main 
problems  in  the  philosophy of  religion. The 
author  first  tries  to explain  the nature of  the 









the  burden  of  proof.  The  parts  that  follow 




for  the  rationality of believing  in God  (Pas-
cal’s wager) and shows its implausibility.
“Why 2 + 2 = 4?”  is  the  title of  the follow-
ing chapter, introducing the main problems of 




objections:  fictionalism,  nominalism,  con-
ceptualism, physicalism, Platonism. He con-
cludes  this  part with  a  discussion  about  the 
nature  of  existence  of mathematical  entities 
(realism and antirealism in mathematics), the 
truth  about mathematical  statements  and  an 
explanation  of  mathematical  truths.  Despite 
the  implausible  arguments  of  mathematical 
realism,  the  author  shows why  this  position 
is so vivid in the philosophy of mathematics, 
explaining  some  specific  characteristics  of 
mathematics.



















as  the  creation  of  the  overwhelming  picture 




cal  reflection of our own beliefs  and acts  is 
perhaps the best option.
In conclusion, I would like to single out at least 
three  admirable  features  of  this  two-volume 
book.  Firstly,  it  is  an  important  philosophi-
cal  contribution,  which  not  only  compiles 
fine-grained  philosophical  arguments  in  one 
place with the author’s original additions and 




















and  reasoned  discussion.  It  represents  quite 
a  useful  schema  for  any  philosophy  teacher 
in his philosophy classes. On the other hand, 
this book is now an unavoidable philosophy 
textbook with useful  tools  for  every  teacher 
and student. It brings: questions at the end of 
each chapter which could be useful for both 
students  (to  test  their  understanding  of  the 
topic dealt with in each chapter) and teachers 
(as a guide for test questions), an impressive 
list  of  references  for  further  reading,  an  in-
structive and detailed Index (in both volumes, 
on 53 pages in total!), including the names of 






of  philosophy  has  ever  been  published  in 




but  also  a  true  cultural  achievement,  which 
deserves and obliges all of  the author’s col-
leagues not only to applaud him sincerely, but 






















































–  [for books] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA) 1971, p. 43.




















–  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 120.





The  editor’s  office,  naturally,  accepts  other  standards  of  referencing  provided  that 
they are consistent throughout a text.








–  (wissenschaftlicher) Originalbeitrag (original /scientific/ paper):  enthält  neue, 
noch unveröffentlichte Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen;
–  Vorbericht (preliminary communication): enthält neue, noch unveröffentlichte Er-
gebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen, aber in Präliminarform;









































–  [für ein Buch] Ernst Bloch, Geist der Utopie, Duncker und Humblot, München–Leip-
zig 1918, S. 123.
–  [für einen Sammelband] Hans Lenk (Hg.), Wissenschaft und Ethik, Reclam, Stutt-
gart 1991.
–  [für  einen Zeitschriftenartikel] Richard Wisser,  „Hegel und Heidegger, oder: die 
Wende  vom Denken  des Denkens  zum  Seinsdenken”,  Synthesis philosophica 4 
(2/1987), S. 301–326.
–  [für  einen Artikel  aus  einem Sammelband oder  ein Buchkapitel] Vittorio Hösle, 
„Ontologie und Ethik bei Hans Jonas”, in: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.), Ethik für die Zu-
kunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, Beck, München 1994, S. 105–125.






–  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik




















–  un article (scientifique) original  (original /scientific/ paper)    comporte  les  nou-
veaux résultats encore inédits  de recherches scientifiques;
–  une communication préliminaire (preliminary communication) comporte sous une 
forme préliminaire  les nouveaux  résultats encore  inédits de  recherches  scientifi-
ques;






leur publication antérieure dans Synthesis philosophica. En acceptant  les  règles de 
publications les auteurs donnent à la révue le droit de première publication sous forme 
imprimée ou électronique.
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